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THE TIES THAT BIND: REEVALUATING THE 
ROLE OF LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS OF 
PATERNITY 
Heather Kolinsky 
          As Justice Brennan observed in Michael H. v. Gerald D. so many 
years ago, we must “identify the point at which a tradition becomes 
firm enough to be relevant to our definition of liberty and the moment at 
which it becomes too obsolete to be relevant any longer.” This Article 
addresses one such tradition, the legal presumption of paternity, and 
examines it through the lens of equal protection, the changing roles of 
fatherhood, and the evolution of marriage.   
          The concept of who is a parent must change to both satisfy equal 
protection as well as modern scientific and societal realties. This 
Article argues that, historically, the constitutionally protected right to 
parent has been improperly conferred on a marriage rather than on an 
individual, particularly with respect to unwed natural fathers. This 
Article focuses on the need for a change in recognition of relationships 
between natural fathers and their children, particularly natural fathers 
of children born to intact marriages.   
          Through that lens, this Article traces the genesis of the legal 
presumption of paternity in the United States. It then undertakes an  
in-depth review and analysis of the United States Supreme Court’s 
“unwed father” cases from Stanley v. Illinois to Michael H. from an 
equal protection perspective. After considering the equal protection 
concerns raised by the United States Supreme Court’s precedent, the 
Article proposes that, based on evolving notions of what fathers and 
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marriages are today, the legal presumption should be relegated to an 
administrative convenience that is fully rebuttable and not limited by 
time. The Article then proposes that in order to accomplish this shift 
and fully recognize all biological parents’ rights, as well as the 
parental rights of others, another commonly held view must be 
challenged—that a child may only have two legal parents. The Article 
suggests that in such circumstances courts should recognize more than 
two parents in order to fully protect parental rights and the need for 
new parental forms is discussed. Finally, the Article proposes how such 
changes might be effected to better protect individual parental rights.  
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In an ideal world, perhaps all parents would be perfect. They 
would live up to their parental responsibilities by providing the 
fullest possible financial and emotional support to their children. 
They would never suffer mental health problems, lose their jobs, 
struggle with substance dependency, or encounter any of the other 
multitudinous personal crises that can make it difficult to meet these 
responsibilities. In an ideal world, parents would never become 
estranged and leave their children caught in the middle. But we do 
not live in such a world. Even happy families do not always fit the 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
Given certain biological realities, when a woman gives birth to a 
child, she is deemed to be that child’s mother.
2
 The biological father, 
on the other hand, cannot be established as the child’s father based 
upon his mere presence at or absence from the child’s birth.
3
 Rather, 
the law has long presumed that a child’s biological father is the man 
married to the biological mother at the time of the child’s birth.
4
 
To some extent, these biological and cultural assumptions are 
fueled by the social expectation, long held as the norm by western 
society, that the woman, as mother, cares for the children, and the 
 
 1. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2584 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 2. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology 
As the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 370 (1991). There is a “presumption of 
biology” conferred upon mothers who carry a child and subsequently give birth to it—mater est 
quam gestation demonstrant (by gestation mother is demonstrated). Id. (citing Redefining 
Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 192–202 (1986); 
U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 36, 
282 (1988)). Hill notes, however, that the problem inherent in this presumption is that in the 
context of the ever-evolving world of surrogacy and assisted reproductive technology, it is now 
quite possible that the woman who carries and bears a child is not the child’s biological mother. 
Id. 
 3. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001) (holding that a father’s presence at the birth 
of his child is not “incontrovertible proof of fatherhood”); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 
n.16 (1983) (holding that father’s parental claims must be gauged by other means than mere 
birth).  
 4. See generally Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REV. 585, 589 (1991) (citing H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: 
LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 15–16 (1971) (“[T]he common law developed the presumption that a 
child born to a married woman was the child of her husband.”). 
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man, as father, provides financial support for those children.
5
 
Superimposed on this assignment of parental roles is the expectation 
that these roles will be assumed within the confines of a legally 
recognized relationship—a marriage consisting of a man and woman 
and their biological children.
6
 Thus, marriage, not biology, often 
confers parental status on a father. These expectations often push 
certain groups of fathers to the periphery in terms of both 
constitutionally protected rights and caregiving roles. 
This expectation has been so pervasive historically that the 
default understanding was that a biological father who did not marry 
his child’s biological mother was not committed emotionally or as a 
 
 5. See NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 34 (2000). Roman Imperial legislation 
required fathers to support children born of a legitimate marriage or concubinage, which replaced 
the classical Roman law of patria potestas. R.H. Helmholz, Support Orders, Church Courts, and 
the Rule of Filius Nullius: A Reassessment of the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 431, 433–34 
(1991) (citing W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 
103 (3d ed. 2007)). Derived from natural law, this obligation originally imposed a duty on all 
parents to nurture and support their children. Id. at 435. However, this support was still framed in 
the context of monetary support or the idea of nourishing the child. Id. In the 1970s there was a 
shift away from fathers as “walking wallets” in the context of divorce, to a full-fledged fathers’ 
rights movement. See Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 653, 656–59 
(1992). Fineman traces the arc from father as superior parent with absolute control and ownership 
of children, and mother as the inferior parent, to the “tender years doctrine” fashioning mother as 
necessary caretaker and father as financial provider, to concepts of shared custody and no 
presumptions in the context of divorce that mother was the better caregiver or the only parent 
who should control custody. Id. Fast-forward to today, and even the debate over same-sex 
marriage has had to tackle these long-entrenched stereotypes. Amici in United States v. Windsor 
noted that the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) argued denying recognition to same sex 
marriage was appropriate to support mothers and fathers raising their biological children, relying 
on the archaic, longstanding stereotype that mothers are nurturers and fathers are providers. Brief 
For Amici Curiae Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children in Support of Respondent 
Edith Windsor Addressing the Merits and Supporting Affirmance at 30, United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 840028; see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 
538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001).  
 6. “A traditional family is typically imagined: a husband and wife—formally married and 
living together—with their biological children. The husband performs as the head of household, 
providing economic support and discipline for the dependent wife and children, who 
correspondingly owe him duties of obedience and respect.” Martha Albertson Fineman, Why 
Marriage?, 9 VA, J. SOC. POL’Y & L 239, 247 n.21 (2001) (quoting Martha Fineman, Masking 
Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2182 (1995)); see 
Mary A. Totz, What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander: Toward Recognition of Men’s 
Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 198 (1994) (citing SARAH WEDDINGTON, A 
QUESTION OF CHOICE 51–53 (1993) (noting that historically society presumed that women would 
want to marry and bear children and men who married these women would support them, and 
those children, financially); see also Kisthardt, supra note 4, at 588 (“The common-law rules also 
reflected the notion that the father-child relationship was primarily an economic one.”).  
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caregiver.
7
 The law also presumed a biological father to be less of a 
parent than the biological mother’s spouse at the time of that child’s 
birth.
8
 Indeed, it prevented a man from being legally recognized as 
the father of his biological child when the mother was married to 
another man, even though he was not the biological father, at the 
time of that child’s birth.
9
 
Legal determinations of paternity have their genesis in these 
social norms, but they no longer reflect the reality of parental roles 
and the institution of marriage itself.
10
 The law also fails to recognize 
 
 7. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972); see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 
n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). In 
fact, Kisthardt notes that it was “not surprising . . . states enacted laws that presumed unwed 
fathers were irresponsible and unconcerned about their children” and denied them legal rights 
such as custody where historically an illegitimate child was a child of no one and often placed in 
the custody of the church. Kisthardt, supra note 4, at 595. In fact, as late as the 1960s, states were 
still refusing to acknowledge the rights of unwed fathers. It was not until 1972 that the Supreme 
Court made it unequivocally clear that unwed fathers had a constitutionally protected right to 
parent their children and, at least to some extent, an automatic presumption that such a father was 
unfit was unconstitutional and inappropriate. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649. 
 8. “Formal, legal, heterosexual marriage continues to dominate our imagination when we 
confront the possibilities of intimacy and family.” Fineman, supra note 5, at 663–64. Thinking 
beyond the implications of legal presumptions of paternity, one has to wonder if a legal discourse 
that is no longer guided by a normative male (married, employed, heterosexual) would encourage 
a better recognition of gendered roles. A question that needs to be considered is whether 
removing the presumption helps to create a new caregiving paradigm that acknowledges mother 
and father as valuable distinct roles separate and apart from the stereotypically gendered roles of 
wife-caregiver and husband-financier. 
 9. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989). There is also a sense, 
particularly with respect to adulterous fathers, that they are being penalized for a married woman 
stepping outside accepted social norms. Laws that punish parents for “immoral” or non-normative 
conduct, continue to proliferate. The Defense of Marriage Act is illustrative. Defense of Marriage 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199; 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (section 3 of DOMA was struck down 
by the Supreme Court in 2013 in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)). In Windsor, 
BLAG asserted that DOMA advanced child welfare by: “(1) providing a stable structure to raise 
unintended and unplanned offspring; (2) encouraging the rearing of children by their biological 
parents; and (3) promoting childrearing by both a mother and father.” Brief for Amici Curiae 
Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children, supra note 5, at 7 (citation omitted). Amici 
argued that these articulated justifications “draw invidious distinctions between families headed 
by opposite-sex parents and families headed by same-sex parents and, by implication, between 
the children in these families.” Id. at 1–2. Thus, the stated intent of the law was nothing more than 
punishment for an identically situated class of children based on nothing more than moral 
disapproval of their parents’ conduct. Id. at 2. Again, a moral judgment, given the form of law 
and affirmative power to deny parents’ rights had an impact on those parents, and their children. 
Consequently, it also has a direct impact on the rights of parents to raise their children.   
 10. Surrogacy and other types of assisted reproductive technology arrangements have 
“force[d] us to confront deeply held beliefs about what makes a ‘mother’ or a ‘father,’ . . . and 
perhaps most fundamentally, what makes a ‘family.’” In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 643 (Wis. 
2013) (quoting Darra L. Hoffman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe”: A State-By-State Survey of 
Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 450 
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the connection and bond a biological father may have to his unborn 
or newly born child.
11
 Instead, they reinforce stereotypical 
understandings about mothers and fathers and do little to facilitate a 
better recognition of the roles of all caregivers, whether social, legal, 
or biological. These laws also blur the lines between parental identity 
and family identity in a way that undercuts a person’s fundamental 
right to procreate and bear children. Thus, a right of association 
supplants an individual right.
12
 At this moment, such presumptions 
are all the more harmful because they no longer reflect the way we 
parent as a society, nor do they properly recognize the types of 
families that can and are being formed to rear the current generation 
of children in this country.  
These decisions and assumptions flow from a faulty legal and 
social premise. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
being a parent is a fundamental right.
13
 However, the level of 
scrutiny given to laws which control recognition of paternity changes 
depending upon the legal relationship between the father and mother 
at the time of birth.
14
 Unfortunately, as Michael H. v. Gerald D.
15
 
illustrates, the stance taken by the Court is that when a man is the 
natural father of a child born to an intact marriage of the natural 
mother and another man, then the natural father’s fundamental right 
to parent is trumped by “the marriage.”
16
 However, that legal 
presumption is based on the assumption that parenthood as a 
 
(2009)). Additionally, in terms of the “traditional” family unit, it no longer looks exactly as it did 
even thirty years ago. By some estimates, approximately two million children are being raised by 
LGBT parents, either in relationships where the parents are co-habitating (perhaps in part because 
they cannot marry) or married, and as single parent families. See Movement Advancement Project 
et al., All Children Matter: How Legal and Social Inequalities Hurt LGBT Families, CENTER FOR 
AM. PROGRESS 1, 7 (2011), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/10 
/pdf/all_children_matter.pdf. 
 11. See generally Part IV infra (discussing the evolution of the paternal role and the outdated 
nature of the presumption). 
 12. This, of course, is a problem because courts have articulated time and again that no child 
is guaranteed the “better” parents. Nor should a parent’s right be dependent on gender or marital 
status. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2572 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 13. This right has been found in the context of procedural and substantive due process 
challenges, as well as equal protection. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 
639–40 (1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 399 (1923). 
 14. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2557; Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110; Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 380 (1979). 
 15. 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).  
 16. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113. 
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fundamental right is designed to protect a marital family unit instead 
of the individuals within that family unit.
17
 It is also based on the 
presumption that an unwed father is not a parent and has no desire to 
be a parent unless proven otherwise. This legal scaffolding has a 
false bottom. As Justice Brennan correctly observed in Michael H., 




The result of this predicate is an imbalance that leaves fathers 
and children vulnerable to laws governing the most intimate of 
relationships.
19
 The law has simply not kept pace with the social and 
scientific realities of our generation, and that inability continues to 
have an impact on parental rights.
20
 There are times when it is 
important to take a step back and reassess the impact of a law or 
policy, both emotionally and practically, in light of significant shifts 
in society, as the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Windsor
21




 17. This is more interesting in Michael H., considering there were two familial units that the 
child had been a part of and the Court chose to recognize the unit that had married parents, not the 
unit that consisted of the biological parents and the child. Justice Alito adopted a similar approach 
in his dissent in Windsor, focusing on family and marriage, instead of focusing on a person’s right 
to marry. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715 (2013). Justice Alito focused solely on 
same-sex marriage which, if supported, would remove the right to marry from a subset of citizens 
just as Michael H. denied a subset of fathers full recognition of their fundamental right to parent 
because a moral judgment was layered upon a right and codified by the law. Id. 
 18. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Instead, what has happened is that 
the right is supplanted by a simple recognition of a legal relationship with the imposition of 
stereotypes that do neither the biological parent, nor the legal parent, any justice. 
 19. See Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 57, 76–78 (2012). While it impacts each member of a biological family 
unit, this Article will focus almost exclusively on the impact upon a biological father whose child 
is born within a marital relationship that is not his. 
 20. See id.; In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 644. It is possible for a child to have as many as five 
different “parents” and there are a total of sixteen different reproductive combinations, including 
sperm donors, egg donors, a surrogate or gestational host, and intended parents. Hill, supra note 
2, at 355. 
 21. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715 (2013).  
 22. Id. at 2689 (“The limitation of lawful marriage to heterosexual couples, which for 
centuries had been deemed both necessary and fundamental, came to be seen in New York and 
certain other States as an unjust exclusion.”); see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) 
(“Times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper serve only to oppress.”). What Windsor also illuminates is the battles we 
still continue to fight in terms of using “tradition” as the rationale for decisions that harm discrete, 
at-risk groups. Justice Scalia posits that this fight is not black and white and that disagreement 
over something so fundamental as marriage can still be politically legitimate. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2711. However, this fight is black and white—or it was black and white until several decades 
ago, when traditional marriage did not include interracial marriage. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 
U.S. 583 (1883) (finding Alabama’s anti-miscegenation statute constitutional). The ruling in Pace 
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The legal presumption of paternity assigned to marriage simply 
does not work the way it was intended anymore. In fact, it serves as 
the foundation for the stripping away of equal protection for 
biological fathers the farther removed they become from the 
“traditional” marital unit. The presumption still serves a helpful 
administrative purpose in easily identifying fathers in simple 
circumstances, but that should be the limit of its role. Instead, a 
putative father should always be able to file a claim, and the courts 
should protect the inchoate relationship between father and child. 
Then, once the father has legal recognition, the court can award legal 
parental rights as appropriate, and impose financial responsibility 
commensurate with those rights. Thus, instead of an all-or-nothing 
distribution of rights, recognition based on biology is simply a 
starting point offering biological fathers the constitutional protection 
to which they are entitled.
23
 
The second change needed is to abandon the assumption that a 
caregiving unit can only have two legally recognized parents. Why 
can’t a child have more than one father, or more than one mother, 
more than two “primary legal” parents?
24
 Therein lies the seed for 
reshaping a more complete, modern concept of paternity and 
parentage.
25
 Imagine a circumstance where simple designations of 
“biological and legal parent” existed such that any iteration or 
combination of blended families could be accommodated and the 
 
was later overturned in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Supreme Court found 
that denying right of marriage to interracial couples violated Equal Protection and Due Process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10–11. If the goal is truly a governmental 
interpretation of the Constitution that protects all persons equally, then it should protect 
everyone’s fundamental rights to marry, procreate, and live their lives without stereotypes built 
into the very laws designed to allow the same citizens to live those lives protected by the 
Constitution. 
 23. See generally Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 
42 GA. L. REV. (2008) (discussing the benefits and burdens of using biology as a basis for legal 
parenthood). 
 24. See, e.g., 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. S.B. 274, Ch. 564 (West); Joanna L. Grossman, 
California Allows Children to Have More Than Two Legal Parents, JUSTIA (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/10/15/california-allows-children-two-legal-parents. 
 25. This Article addresses paternity, more specifically, the impact of the marital legal 
presumption on a sub-class of fathers as an illustration of why such presumptions regarding 
parental roles are problematic and need to change. However, this is a preliminary step in 
discussing the much larger issue of reconsidering parental forms as part of a broader discussion of 
how we conceive the concept of “parent.” I will touch upon parental forms, but I will not delve 
into the issues with regard to parental forms except as a natural extension of the discussion at 
hand. 
THE TIES THAT BIND 10/92/2014 10:51 AM 
232 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:223 
state could still protect the interests of children. Biological parents 
would no longer lose their recognition and rights unless they 
voluntarily relinquished them, but the law would define how and to 
what extent those rights are exercised.
26
 Parents, no matter the 
circumstance, could be recognized and protected inside or outside of 
the marital relationship and given status. Ultimately, this new 
paradigm of familial relationships would better honor the connection 
between parents and their children, regardless of their genesis. 
Part II of this Article discusses the legal presumption of 
paternity, and how it has developed in this country. Parents’ 
constitutional rights, specifically those of unmarried biological 
fathers, are examined in Part III. Part IV discusses reasons for 
reconsidering the purpose of legal presumptions of paternity. Finally, 
in Part V, different methods of effecting such changes are 
considered, including limiting the effects of legal presumptions of 
paternity and recognizing more than two primary parents as an 
appropriate caregiving unit. 
II.  LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS OF PATERNITY 
Legitimacy has always been inextricably linked to a child born 
in wedlock.
27
 In England, the common law provided a simple test to 
establish legitimacy of a child born of a lawful marriage.
28
 Known as 
the “four seas” rule, the law provided that “if the husband be within 
the four seas, within the jurisdiction of the king of England, if the 
wife has issue, no proof is to be admitted to prove the child a bastard 
unless the husband has an apparent impossibility of procreation.”
29
 In 
other words, if the four seas requirement was satisfied, and the child 
was born within a month or a day after marriage between parties of 
 
 26. For the purposes of this Article, involuntary termination of parental rights when there is 
neglect, abuse, or other issues between parent and child are not discussed. 
 27. “We term all bastards that are born out of lawful marriage.” THOMAS COVENTRY, COKE 
UPON LITTLETON 243 b § 399 (Saunders and Benning 1830). Thus a child born out of wedlock 
was deemed fillius nullius—the child of no one. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129 (J. Chitty ed. 1857). Early jurisprudence in the United States 
recognized that while a bastard was generally considered the relative of no one, a mother had a 
right to custody and control of him as his natural guardian. E.g., Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. 109, 
110 (1806); June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of 
Family identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1309–10 (2004). 
 28. COVENTRY, supra note 27. 
 29. Id. Coke provided examples including “if the husband be but eight years old, or under 
the age of procreation.” Id.  
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full lawful age, the child was deemed legitimate.
30
 Thus, the non-
access of the legal father was the only legitimate factual question to 




The ability to rebut the presumption evolved over time so that if 
there was any chance the child was born of the marriage, then 
legitimacy was presumed; but if the evidence overwhelmingly 
suggested otherwise, then the presumption would be disregarded in 
favor of reality.
32
 Thus, as the New York Court of Appeals explained 
in In re Findlay,
33
 “The presumption does not consecrate as truth the 




There were good reasons for a simple rule that presumed 
legitimacy. Presumptions served a practical purpose at a time when 
there was no other way to determine a child’s parentage. It protected 
the mother from accusations of infidelity; neither party to a marriage 
could testify as such.
35
 It also protected the passage of estates and 




Initially, the American courts took a similar view, although there 
was some recognition that the level of formalism built into the 
English test led in some instances to ridiculous results.
37
 As time has 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Shuler v. Bull, 15 S.C. 421, 428–29 (1881) (quoting State v. Shumpert, 1 S.C. 87 
(1869)). That rule, however, was later overruled in Pendrell v. Pendrell, 2 Strange 925 (1732). 
 32. See In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (1930); see also Serafin v. Serafin, 258 N.W.2d 
461 (Mich. 1977) (discussing the evolution of the ability to rebut the presumption).   
 33. 170 N.E. 471 (1930). 
 34. Id. at 473. 
 35. This is more commonly known as Lord Mansfield’s rule. It provided that evidence could 
not be offered in court to bastardize a child that was otherwise born of a marriage. Goodright v. 
Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 592 (1777); see Serafin, 258 N.W.2d at 464 n.1 (Coleman, J., concurring). 
However, as a practical matter, evidence could be offered to prove or disprove the marriage itself, 
and the time of birth to establish it actually occurred during the marriage. Goodright, 2 Cowp. at 
593–94.  
 36. See, e.g., Page v. Dennison, 1 Grant 377, 380 (Pa. 1856) (opining that the English ruling 
class preferred such a restrictive rule because it provided a “mode of ascertaining the line of 
succession in their tenants, and their other rights of lordship which was much more easily 
understood than any legitimate process of arriving at the real truth”). 
 37. While early American courts continued to recognize the concept of pater est quem 
nuptioe demonstrant, there was recognition that the general rule had undergone some changes 
that permitted introduction of evidence to overcome the presumption. Shuler v. Bull, 15 S.C. 421, 
422–23 (1881). The court recognized that “policy, public decency, and the peace of families” 
could still be honored while making more realistic inquiries into whether a child was actually the 
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passed, the states have shifted positions on the issue of a putative 
father’s right to maintain an action for paternity with respect to a 
child born of a marriage. 
Some states still refuse to recognize a putative father’s right to 
challenge the marital presumption. In Alabama for example, no one, 
including a biological father, has standing to challenge the paternity 
of a child born of a marriage except the presumed legal father.
38
 
Recently, an Alabama court reaffirmed the strident nature of this 
policy, refusing to permit a biological father to intervene in a divorce 
proceeding where the presumed father sued for divorce on the 
grounds of adultery, sought a paternity determination, and then 




In Florida, a putative father generally has no right to maintain a 
paternity action where a child is born of a marriage. There is an 
exception, but it requires the father to demonstrate the following 
 
issue of a particular marriage such that the fact of the marriage alone was not necessarily enough. 
Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went further, noting that while there was a time that “courts 
paid very little regard to the fact of paternity, and satisfied themselves with the facts of marriage 
and maternity in questions of heirship” such strict adherence to the maxim of a man who marries 
a woman becomes the father of her children had become shocking to “modern notions.” Page, 1 
Grant at 379–80. Thus, in a progressive stance, the court aptly noted that allowing absurd notions 
of ancient jurisprudence to be perpetuated should not be tolerated as “a system generally retains 
the dregs of an error, long after it has been discovered and condemned.” Id. at 380–81. In 
comparison to the progressive stance taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1856, the Fifth 
District Court of Appeal in Florida in 2001 took the stance that a child born of a marriage was the 
issue of that marriage even though the wife admitted an affair with the man challenging paternity, 
and that man had been permitted to visit with the child and offered financial support. Bellomo v. 
Gagliano, 815 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). Thus, while the courts may have 
sidestepped the dregs of imposing paternity on an unwilling legal father, modern courts are still 
reluctant to recognize paternity of a willing biological father outside a legal marriage who has not 
otherwise voluntarily ceded his rights. Clearly, some dregs of error remain. 
 38. ALA. CODE § 26-17-607(a) (2013); Ex parte C.A.P, 683 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Ala. 2000). 
In C.A.P., the Alabama Supreme Court justified this position, even where the child was conceived 
while the biological parents were cohabitating, but was born after the biological mother married 
another man, because “it is not logical that two men could be presumed to be the child’s father. 
The presumption in favor of [the husband] is an ancient one, supported by logic, common sense, 
and justice.” Id. at 1010–11 (alteration in original) (quoting Ex Parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406, 412 
(Ala. 1989)). 
 39. D.F.H. v. J.D.G., 125 So. 3d 146, 148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). “The court finds that the 
presumption that [the husband] is the father of the child born of his marriage is among the 
weightiest of presumptions in the law, and the relationship between [the child and the husband] as 
daughter and father should not be overcome even if the allegations of [D.F.H.] are true. [D.F.H.] 
assumed the risk that this very circumstance would occur when he entered into a sexual 
relationship with [the wife]. While [D.F.H.’s] consequences are substantial, the court does not 
have the authority to overturn the long-standing law in the area—law which protects innocent 
children from the mistakes of adults.” Id. (citing trial court’s opinion).   
THE TIES THAT BIND 10/92/2014 10:51 AM 
Fall 2014] THE TIES THAT BIND 235 
three things: (1) the biological mother assents to the paternity action; 
(2) the biological father has an established relationship with the 
child; and (3) the legal father has been remiss in some way; or if he 
can otherwise demonstrate the marriage is no longer “intact.”
40
 
Other states have given putative fathers a conditional right to 
challenge paternity. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld a putative 
father’s equal protection claim and found that he was entitled to 
bring an action for paternity of a child born of an intact marriage 
during the same period that the mother of that child was entitled to 
bring an action against him under the Uniform Parentage Act.
41
 
Thus, an unwed biological father has the right to challenge paternity 




 40. See J.S. v. S.M.M., 67 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (finding no right to 
maintain action where child born and conceived during marriage and married parents oppose 
paternity claim); Bellomo, 815 So. 2d at 721 (finding putative father had no right to challenge 
presumption where both mother and legal father objected, even though he had regularly visited 
child for first twelve months of child’s life and offered to contribute financially); Fernandez v. 
McKenney, 776 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (permitting paternity claim where 
biological father raised children most of their lives, children were born of estranged marriage, 
legal father failed to support financially although he still wanted visitation, and mother was now 
married to biological father); S.D. v. A.G., 764 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (putative 
father could not intervene in divorce proceeding to challenge paternity where legal parents 
opposed, more than two and a half years had passed, and putative father had no relationship with 
child); I.A. v. H.H., 710 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding putative father has no 
right to initiate paternity proceeding if both married parents objected); see also Daniel v. Daniel, 
695 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1997) (holding legal father no longer required to support child after 
marriage ended and father had not committed to supporting child); Dep’t of Health and Rehab. 
Servs. v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993) (“Once children are born legitimate, they have a 
right to maintain that status both factually and legally if doing so is in their best interests.”). But 
see Lander v. Smith, 906 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding putative father could 
challenge paternity, even when both married parents objected, where child was conceived and 
born while mother was married but separated; biological father’s name was placed on birth 
certificate; he offered support; and he had relationship with child). 
 41. R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666, 671 (Colo. 1980) (addressing both federal and state 
constitutional claims). The court held that “so long as the UPA grants a natural mother judicial 
access for a period of years to seek a determination of paternity against the natural father of a 
child born during the marriage of the natural mother to another, equal protection of the laws under 
the United States and Colorado constitutions mandates that a claiming natural father be granted 
judicial access and standing to establish his paternity of that child during that same period of 
time.” Id. (interpreting CO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-105, 107 (1978)). Reflecting an undercurrent 
present in so many opinions, Justice Lohr, while conceding some unwed natural fathers may be 
entitled to parental rights, stated that “it requires more imagination than I can summon to find any 
legitimate expectation of a legally recognized relationship based solely on the blood ties between 
the child conceived of an adulterous relationship and the natural father of that child.” Id. at 676 
(Lohr, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 671 (majority opinion). 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts recognized that, 
as a matter of policy, a putative father could maintain an action in 
equity to challenge the paternity of his biological child born of the 
mother’s marriage to another man, but only if he could demonstrate a 
substantial parent-child relationship by clear and convincing 
evidence.
43
 Clearly, this kind of evidentiary requirement can be 
daunting because demonstrating a sufficient relationship as a 
threshold matter will be difficult in all but the most unusual 
circumstances because it requires access.
44
 
On the other hand, the Texas Supreme Court has held that 
unmarried putative fathers have a right to seek paternity even if the 
married mother and father oppose the action.
45
 The court clarified, 
however, that such a right would only extend to fathers whose “early 





 43. C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 371–72 (Mass. 1990). The court carved out this equity 
exception even though there was a Massachusetts statute that did not otherwise permit a putative 
father to seek a paternity determination and the Supreme Court itself had decided several years 
earlier such a claim was not cognizable. Id. at 368. In 1985 the Massachusetts Supreme Court had 
held that a putative father had no constitutional or common law right to challenge the paternity of 
a child conceived during an intact marriage. P.B.C. v. D.H., 483 N.E.2d 1094 (Mass. 1985). In 
that case, the child was conceived while the mother was married, born after the mother was 
divorced, and the putative father sought paternity testing and an adjudication after the mother 
remarried the legal father. Id. The court based its decision on affording legitimacy to children 
wherever possible and “strengthening and encouraging family life for the protection and care of 
children.” Id. at 1099. 
 44. See, e.g., C.D. v. S.M., 978 N.E.2d (2012). 
 45. In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994). The court, relying on state constitutional 
grounds, found that a statute that prevented putative fathers from making such claims violated 
due process. Id. The unusual facts of this case indicated that the child was likely conceived while 
the married mother was cohabitating with the putative father during her divorce from her 
husband, with whom she later reconciled. Id.; see also Henderson v. Wietzkowski, 841 S.W.2d 
101 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding statute prohibiting putative father from bringing paternity 
action violated due course of law provision of State Constitution); Wolfgang Hirczy, Larry 
Succeeds Where Michael Failed: Texas Courts Recognize Parental Rights Claims Denied by the 
United States Supreme Court, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1621 (1996) (discussing the expansion of 
individual rights on state constitutional grounds). 
 46. In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d at 198. Texas law permits a putative father to file a paternity 
challenge within the first four years of a child’s birth. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.607 (Vernon 
2011). However, a presumed father may challenge paternity at any time on the basis of fraud. Id. 
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III.  UNMARRIED BIOLOGICAL FATHERS AND THE RIGHT TO PARENT 
A.  The Supreme Court’s View 
The Supreme Court acknowledges that “the custody, care and 
nurture of the child resides first in the parents, whose primary 
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state 
can neither supply nor hinder.”
47
 Indeed “freedom of personal choice 
in matters of . . . family life is one of the liberties protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
48
 Thus, the Due 
Process Clause has been invoked to protect the integrity of the family 
unit.
49
 However, the Court has acknowledged that “[t]o [simply] say 
that the test of equal protection should be the ‘legal’ rather than the 
biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection 
Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such ‘legal’ 
lines as it chooses.”
50
   
At the heart of any Supreme Court decision regarding paternity 
is a recognition, on some tangible level, a biological parent’s 
connection to his or her child is an inalienable right, tied to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and it is a connection that 
should only be severed by the state under limited circumstances.
51
 
However, Justice Stewart, echoing a widely held belief at the time, 
posited that a biological father’s parental rights are inferior to those 
of the mother. He wrote that “[p]arental rights do not spring full-
blown from the biological connection between parent and child. 
They require relationships more enduring . . . The mother carries and 
bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. 
The validity of the father’s parental claims must be gauged by other 
measures.”
52
 Thus, in Justice Stewart’s view, biology merely 
 
 47. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158 (1944)). 
 48. Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)). 
 49. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 414 U.S. at 639–40. 
 50. Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968). 
 51. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding in a case involving 
involuntary sterilization that procreation is a basic, fundamental right). 
 52. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 & n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 
U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). Justice Stewart first writes that parental rights 
(presumably those that deserve constitutional protection) require more than just a biological 
connection to a child but then he suggests that a woman acquires them via gestation and birth—
even though she has not shown any indication of an intent to care for the child, support the child, 
or to develop a substantial relationship with the child. Id. As if to punctuate the dated notions he 
espoused, Justice Stewart also indicated that when a biological father and mother’s wishes 
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presents an opportunity for a natural father to develop a relationship 
with his natural child, but to realize that opportunity, an unwed father 
must take some affirmative action to “grasp that opportunity and 
accept . . . some measure of responsibility for the child’s future in 
order to enjoy ‘the blessings of the parent-child relationship.’”
53
 
However, once that opportunity has been grasped, the Court has 
acknowledged that, “a father, no less than a mother, has a 
constitutionally protected right to the ‘companionship, care, custody, 
and management’ of ‘the children he has sired and raised.’”
54
 
More recently, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
55
 Justice Scalia 
observed that the Court’s decision “needlessly demean[ed] the rights 
of parenthood.”
56
 Justice Scalia observed: 
It has been the constant practice of the common law to 
respect the entitlement of those who bring a child into the 
world to raise that child. We do not inquire whether leaving 
a child with his parents is “in the best interests of the child.” 
It sometimes is not, he would be better off raised by 
someone else. But parents have their rights, no less than 
children do. This father wants to raise his daughter and the 
 
conflict, it is in the best interest of children to favor the mother as her parental rights take 
precedence over any substantive constitutional claims the biological father may have in that 
circumstance. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart’s comment is 
all the more troubling because Caban involved an adoption proceeding that would have severed 
the biological father’s relationship with his children completely. 
 53. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. Of course, a married biological father, or frankly, a man married 
to the biological mother, has no comparable requirement as marriage creates a presumption he has 
affirmatively undertaken the care of the child financially, which is the subtext that underlies many 
of these decisions in addition to a bias in favor of a married family versus a natural biological 
family. 
 54. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1975). Weinberger involved a challenge 
to the Social Security Act by a widower who wished to stay home with his children after his wife 
passed away. The Act permitted payment of benefits to deceased workers’ widows, but not to 
widowers, based on an overly generalized view that only mothers would want to stay home and 
care for their children rather than work. Id. at 643. At the time, cases before the Supreme Court 
began to reflect attempts to diminish gender stereotyping that damaged women’s ability to work, 
but as Weinberger illustrates, the underlying stereotype cut both ways, harming a woman’s ability 
to provide for her family and harming a father’s ability to choose to exit the workforce and be the 
primary caregiver for his children instead of the primary financial support for his family. By 
recognizing that men did not have to be primary earners and that they may too want to stay home 
with their children, the Court’s decision protected both men and women from “archaic and 
overbroad” generalizations. Id. But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 55. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
 56. Id. at 2572 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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statute amply protects his right to do so. There is no reason 
in law or policy to dilute that protection.
57
 
Unfortunately, the primary Supreme Court jurisprudence with 
respect to unmarried biological fathers, particularly those whose 
children are born of a marriage, is at odds with Justice Scalia’s 
observation in Baby Girl and more aligned with Justice Stewart’s 
opinion.
58
 In the Supreme Court’s seminal cases on the rights of 
unwed biological fathers, Stanley v. Illinois
59





, Lehr v. Robertson
62
, and Michael H. v. 
Gerald D.,
63
 the beginning premise is that an unwed biological father 
is not a “parent.”
64
 The corollary, of course, is that an unwed 
biological father does not intend to be a parent.
65
 Both of these 
presumptions are based solely on the lack of marital status. This is a 
problem in and of itself,
66
 but it is compounded by the fact that these 
are fathers who, as a group, are not perceived to have the same kind 




The Supreme Court, in defining both parental rights and the 
rights of illegitimate children, has come to conclude that unwed 
biological fathers will never enjoy the same instant recognition as a 
 
 57. Id. This is interesting considering Justice Scalia would not afford similar rights in 
Michael H., where he chose to protect the more socially desirable family unit at the expense of a 
biological father’s established relationship with his daughter. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129. 
 58. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2571–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Caban v. Mohammed, 
441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
 59. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 60. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 61. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 62. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 63. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 64. Instead, he has the opportunity to become a parent. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (observing that 
the biological connection offers a natural father the opportunity to develop a parent-child 
relationship with his offspring). 
 65. See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650, 665–66; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263 (marriage is best way 
for biological father to protect parent-child relationship). 
 66. What this means, in essence, is that in order to best protect his fundamental right to 
parent, a biological father must marry the mother of his child. To do anything less is to risk that 
relationship, even if the father has otherwise done everything a married father might do, and 
perhaps even more. Considering that the right to marry, and conversely the right not to marry, is 
also a fundamental right, it creates a troubling situation where a man may be forced to marry 
when he would otherwise not want to do so. It also means that his ability to protect his 
relationship with his child is dependent upon a third person who may not want to marry and who 
retains near complete control of the father’s parent-child relationship regardless of his desire to 
parent and his connection with that child. 
 67. See Kisthardt, supra note 4. 
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parent as biological mothers.
68
 Further, absent affirmative acts, those 
fathers may be deprived of their parent-child connection with a 
biological child without their consent or, in some instances, without 
their knowledge, and sometimes even in the face of active fraud on 
the part of the mother.
69
 
B.  Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and Michael H.—Fashioning a 
Framework for Unwed Biological Father’s Rights—A Dantean 
Journey in Three Parts 
1.  Stanley v. Illinois—You Are Not a  
“Real” Parent but if No One Else Is Available,  
You Might Do 
In Illinois in the mid-twentieth century, the starting point for 
considering any man’s parental connection to a child was not 
whether the man was the biological father of that child, but rather, 
whether the man was married to the mother of that child.
70
 That 
relationship, that official governmental act, was the fountainhead 
from which all paternal rights flowed because, according to the state 
 
 68. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. 
 69. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261–63; In re Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180, 1184–85 (Kan. 
2008) (finding father not entitled to notice of adoption even where mother lied and took extreme 
measures to hide child’s birth from father, because he failed to affirmatively assert his parental 
rights prior to and at the time of the child’s birth). In A.A.T., the Kansas Supreme Court noted 
other instances where deception on the mother’s part, or lack of awareness on the father’s, did not 
prevent a termination of the natural father’s right to his relationship with his child. Id. at 1194 
(citing In re Adoption of S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606 (Ark. 1998) (holding that although father 
unaware of child, notice of adoption proceeding not constitutionally required when “biological 
father was not interested enough in the outcome of his sexual encounter . . . to even inquire 
concerning the possibility of her pregnancy”); In re Zacharia D., 862 P.2d 751 (Cal. 1993) 
(holding biological father who was unaware of paternity until child turned fifteen months old was 
not constitutionally entitled to reunification services); In re Tinya W., 765 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (Ill. 
2002) (finding father unfit based on failure to provide any financial or emotional support to child, 
despite father’s lack of awareness of paternity); In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281 
(Ind. App. 2000) (finding state’s interest in child’s early permanent placement precludes father 
from contesting adoption when father unaware of paternity and not timely included on putative 
father registry). In A.A.T., the court concluded that the natural father’s constitutional rights were 
not violated because the mother’s private act, not a state action, led to the adoption of his child 
against his wishes. A.A.T., 196 P.3d at 1198. Instead, the state had a right to protect the child 
where the mother did not want the child and surrendered him for adoption. Id. at 1197–98. 
Carbone has noted that several, but not all, states have given unwed fathers rights beyond those 
offered by the Supreme Court. Carbone, supra note 27, at 1323. 
 70. In Illinois at the time, a parent was statutorily defined as “‘the father and mother of a 
legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and 
includes any adoptive parent.’” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650 (quoting 37 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
§ 701-14 (West 1972)). 
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of Illinois, most unmarried fathers were considered unsuitable and 
neglectful parents.
71
 It was such that, if an unwed mother died, her 
child became a ward of the state, regardless of whether the biological 
father was part of his children’s lives or whether he was a fit 
parent.
72
 The biological father of those children was not even 
afforded a right to be heard; instead he simply was, to borrow a 
phrase, pater nullius, the father of no one.
73
 
These presumptions were at the heart of the controversy in 
Stanley v. Illinois. In that case, Peter Stanley cohabitated with Joan 
Stanley on and off for eighteen years, and during that time they had 
three children.
74
 When Joan died, the children were declared wards 
of the state because Peter and Joan had never married.
75
 
Peter brought an equal protection claim arguing that he was not 
being treated the same as unwed biological mothers or married or 
divorced biological fathers.
76
 He argued that no other class of 
biological parents were required to come before the courts of the 
state of Illinois to prove their fitness to be a parent before being 
recognized as such. 
The Supreme Court held that the subject statute violated due 
process because Stanley, as an unmarried biological father, was 




 71. Id. In its brief, the State of Illinois submitted that based both on history and culture there 
were “very real differences . . . between the married father and the unmarried father, in terms of 
their interests in children and their legal responsibility for their children” and that the presence or 
absence in the home on a day-to-day basis is a very real difference between married and 
unmarried fathers, and that studies support the proposition “that men are not naturally inclined to 
childrearing.” Id. at 654 n.5 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It also took the 
position that illegitimate children required more protection than legitimate children because a 
“legitimate child usually is raised by both parents with the attendant familial relationships and a 
firm concept of home and identity, the illegitimate child normally knows only one parent—the 
mother.” Id. at 653 n.5. 
 72. See In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814 (Ill. 1970). Conversely, married fathers, divorced 
fathers, widowed fathers, separated fathers, and unwed mothers were entitled to a presumption 
they were fit to raise their children. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647. 
 73. Just as a child who is born outside of a marriage was deemed fillius nullis, so too an 
unwed father of an illegitimate child at that time in Illinois simply had no legal status as a parent. 
His child’s illegitimacy and his marital status rendered him presumptively unfit, but more 
importantly it denied him any opportunity to be heard on the matter. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647. 
 74. Id. at 646. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. In explaining the procedural due process problem with the state’s presumption, Justice 
Douglas explained, “what is the state interest in separating children from fathers without a 
hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit in a particular disputed case? We 
observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from 
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Supreme Court did not address the underlying statutory definition or 
the requirement that Stanley demonstrate his fitness to the court. The 
Court’s primary concern was that the state failed to allow Stanley a 
hearing before presumptively terminating his rights and declaring his 
children wards of the state.
78
 
The Supreme Court’s decision itself was somewhat contentious, 
and the dissenting justices took the majority to task for deciding a 
constitutional issue that had not been raised—procedural due 
process.
79
 However, the negative space created by that decision 
spoke volumes about the Court’s position on unwed biological 
fathers. In not ruling on the equal protection issue decided by the 
Illinois Supreme Court, the Court inherently found that unwed 
biological fathers do not have the same fundamental constitutional 
rights as biological mothers, whether married or not, and do not have 
the same rights as married biological or non-biological fathers.
80
 In 
essence, Stanley’s marital status made him presumptively unfit to 
parent. 
A passage in the dissent is telling about the presumptions 
underlying this decision, both in the dissent and in the majority 
opinion. Chief Justice Burger wrote: 
I believe that a State is fully justified in concluding, on the 
basis of common human experience, that the biological role 
of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates 
stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds 
resulting from the male’s often casual encounter. This view 
is reinforced by the observable fact that most unwed 
mothers exhibit a concern for their offspring either 
 
the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own articulated goal 
when it needlessly separates him from his family.” Id. at 652–53. 
 78. In coming to this conclusion, the Court noted that “[i]t may be, as the State insists, that 
most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents. It may also be that Stanley is such a 
parent and that his children should be placed in other hands. But all unmarried fathers are not in 
this category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children.” Id. at 654. Thus, the 
Court found that “all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness 
before their children are removed from their custody.” Id. at 658. 
 79. Id. at 659–63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. Interestingly, the dissent makes much of the fact that there was no adult with a legally 
enforceable obligation for care and support of the children, which is what necessitated the 
dependency proceeding in the first place. However, the reason that there was none was because 
the State of Illinois deprived Stanley of a legally recognized relationship from which such an 
obligation would flow. And, the State did so in the interest of illegitimate children because unwed 
biological fathers were not desirable parents. 
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permanently or at least until they are safely placed for 
adoption, while unwed fathers rarely burden either the 
mother or the child with their attentions or loyalties. 
Centuries of human experience buttress this view of the 
realities of human conditions and suggest that unwed 
mothers of illegitimate children are generally more 




Chief Justice Burger found these “generalizations” provided a 
sufficient basis to “sustain a statutory classification whose objective 
was not to penalize unwed parents but to further the welfare of 
illegitimate children.”
82
 As such, he refused to construe the Equal 
Protection Clause to require the statutory definition of parent to be 
drawn so “meticulously” to include “such unusual unwed fathers” 
like Stanley, while excluding the not so unusual unwed fathers who, 
according to Chief Justice Burger, as a group, want nothing to do 
with their illegitimate children.
83
 
2.  Quilloin v. Walcott
84
, Caban v. Mohammed
85
, and 
 Lehr v. Robertson
86
—The Adoption Cases— 
You Are Not a Real Parent; Married People Are Real Parents 
a.  Quilloin v. Walcott 
Leon Quilloin challenged the constitutionality of Georgia’s 
adoption laws, which denied an unmarried biological father the right 





 81. Id. at 665–66 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 666. It seems naïve to think that this statutory classification was not designed to 
punish fathers who do not marry a woman with whom they have a child. The statutory 
classification essentially required marriage or, as the State put it, “a formal legal proceeding akin 
to marriage,” in order for Stanley to exercise his fundamental right to the care, custody, and 
companionship of his children. That is a penalty, and one that is drawn too broadly as it excludes 
an entire group of fathers from legal protection. 
 83. Id. 
 84. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 85. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 86. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 87. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247. At the time, a child born in wedlock could not be adopted 
without the consent of each living parent who had not voluntarily surrendered their rights or been 
adjudicated unfit. Id. at 248. Unless an illegitimate child was otherwise legitimated by the 
biological father prior to the adoption, however, the mother was the only recognized parent and 
had exclusive authority to consent to an adoption. Id. at 249. In order to legitimate his child, a 
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Leon Quilloin and Ardell Williams had a child in December 
1964.
88
 Quilloin was listed as the father on the child’s birth 
certificate, and the child was named Darrell Quilloin.
89
 Quilloin and 
Williams never married or maintained a home together, and in 
September 1967, Williams married Randall Walcott.
90
 For the first 
few years of the Walcotts’ marriage, the child lived with his maternal 
grandmother, but he began living with the Walcotts in 1969.
91
 In 
1976, Randall Walcott sought to adopt his stepson, and the adoption 
was granted over Quilloin’s objection.
92
 
This case took up where Stanley left off, considering the “degree 
of protection a State must afford to the rights of an unwed father in a 
situation . . . in which the countervailing interests are more 
substantial.”
93
 The Court in Quilloin was faced with the dilemma of 
balancing the state’s interests in recognizing the rights of biological 
mothers and fathers, both individually and in and among family 
units.
94
 Ultimately, the Court had to determine whether the  
best-interests-of-the-child standard adequately protected Quilloin’s 
parental rights when any other parent’s rights in Georgia were 




The general rule regarding adoption in Georgia was that written 
consent of the living parents of the child was required.
96
 However, an 
exception for illegitimate children was carved out, requiring only a 
mother’s consent, unless the father had legitimated the child by 
 
biological father had to either marry the mother and acknowledge the child as his own, or obtain a 
court order declaring the child legitimate and capable of inheriting from his father. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 250 n.6. 
 90. Id. at 247. 
 91. Id. at 247 n.1. 
 92. Id. at 247. 
 93. Id. at 248. More substantial apparently than no available parent other than the state. 
 94. Id. at 248. 
 95. Id. at 254. In this case, the courts, both in Georgia and the Supreme Court, unnecessarily 
substituted “fit” with “best interests” based upon Quilloin’s failure to marry Williams. 
 96. Id. at 248 n.2 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(1) (1975): “no adoption shall be 
permitted except with written consent of the living parents of a child”). Section 74-403(2) 
provides that consent is not required from a parent who has surrendered rights in an adoption 
proceeding, is found to have abandoned the child or failed to comply with court-imposed support 
orders, has had their parental rights terminated, is insane or otherwise incapacitated from giving 
consent, or cannot be found by diligent search. Id. 
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marriage or court order.
97
 Quilloin had not attempted to legitimate 
the child until Walcott petitioned to adopt him.
98
 
Unlike Stanley, Quilloin’s request for legitimation and visitation 
rights, as well as his objection to the adoption petition, were heard by 
the court.
99
 The court found that Quilloin had never abandoned the 
child; he had provided financial support, albeit irregularly; and he 
had visited with the child and had given gifts to his son.
100
 However, 
Williams had decided the child’s contact with Quilloin was having a 
disruptive effect on her family.
101
 Furthermore, the child expressed 
the desire to be adopted by Walcott, although he also expressed a 
desire to continue to visit with Quilloin on occasion after the 
adoption.
102
 However, under Georgia law, the child could not be 
adopted unless his biological father’s rights, including his right to 
visitation, were terminated.
103
 The trial court granted the adoption, 
finding that it was in the best interests of the child.
104
 
The Supreme Court found that Quilloin’s substantive due 
process rights were not violated by the application of a  
“best-interests-of-the-child” standard.
105
 While the Court 
acknowledged that substantive due process would be violated if the 
state attempted to break up a natural family over the parents’ 
objections without some showing of unfitness and based solely on 
the best interests of the child,
106
 the Court again proceeded from a 
faulty assumption, that the relationship between Quilloin and his son 
was not a “natural family.” Of course, the definition of a family unit, 
the one alluded to and given legal deference, was the family unit 
 
 97. Id. at 248 n. 3, 249 n.4. 
 98. Id. at 250. The law in Georgia was changed after this case in an attempt to ensure that 
biological fathers had notice and an opportunity to consent or object to an adoption. 
 99. Id. Thus, the due process concerns raised in Stanley were not present in this case. 
 100. Id. at 251. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 251 n.11. 
 103. Id. Comparing this circumstance to one in which Quilloin might have been married to 
Williams, no matter how briefly, further highlights the inequity in using marriage as a 
determinant for fatherhood. As a divorced father, Quilloin’s less-than-stellar parenting and 
financial support would not have deprived him of his rights to visitation and custody of his son. 
He could not be deprived of those rights, let alone have them terminated, simply because the 
child’s mother did not think it was beneficial for her “new” family. 
 104. Id. at 251. The trial court also decided that legitimation and visitation were not in the 
best interests of the child. Id. 
 105. Id. at 254. 
 106. Id. at 255 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality 
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977)). 
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where a marriage was involved, even though the stepparent seeking 
adoption was not the child’s biological father. The Court was clear in 
explaining its rationale that this was not a case where an unwed 
father sought actual or legal custody of his child,
107
 nor was it a case 
where the proposed adoption would place the child with an entirely 
new set of parents.
108
 Instead,  
the result of the adoption [was] to give full recognition to a 
family unit already in existence, a result desired by all 
concerned, except [Quilloin]. Whatever might be required 
in other situations, we cannot say that the State was 
required in this situation to find anything more than the 
adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the “best 
interest of the child.”
109
 
The problem, of course, is that bestowing full recognition on the 
family unit favored by law (the marital family unit of one mother and 
one father) is accomplished at the expense of another family unit that 
has been in existence as well.
110
 Thus, once again, although not as 
obviously as in Stanley, the Court suggested that unwed biological 
fathers are not parents because they have not affirmatively and 




 107. Id. Again, this begs the question. Quilloin was listed as the child’s father on his birth 
certificate. He had access to the child. He supported the child financially and was not required by 
court order to do more than he was doing. In a family dynamic such as this, he may have felt he 
had what he wanted. He probably saw no need to legitimate his natural relationship with his son 
under those circumstances. He was not trying to break up the current “family.” Rather, one can 
imagine he simply wanted to have a relationship with his son. However, because the child’s 
mother decided it was no longer appropriate, he was denied those basic rights because his 
relationship existed outside the preferred marital unit. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. In fact, one could argue there were three distinct family units in addition to the one the 
Court decided to protect. The first, the family unit of Quilloin and his son Darrell; the second, 
Quilloin, his son Darrell, and Darrell’s mother, Williams; and the third, the family unit of 
Quilloin, Williams, Walcott, Darrell’s step-father, Darrell, and Darrell’s half-brother. 
 111. Quilloin fails in another interesting way because clearly Quilloin satisfied the “biology 
plus” standard in the sense that he acknowledged paternity and developed a relationship with his 
child. He is the father listed on the child’s birth certificate. However limited, he had an ongoing 
relationship with his child; one that his child desired to continue. To truly protect his rights, 
particularly in this case, his legitimation petition should have been decided as others are and then 
if he objected there would be no adoption. At that point, the heart of the issue, visitation, could 
have been decided by the Court in the child’s best interests. Evidence could have been offered by 
the child’s mother on the disruption to the stepfamily. But instead, Quilloin was required to 
subject himself to things not required of any other “living parent” and to be content with lesser 
protections than those parents when he did seek legal recourse. 
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affirmed the Georgia statute that permitted unwed biological fathers 
to be treated differently than other “living” parents. And, in doing so, 
the Court favored marriage over biology as the proper indication of 
parenthood and afforded less constitutional protection to biological 
fathers because they are perceived as not being “real” parents.
112
 
b.  Caban v. Mohammed 
Caban involved an equal protection challenge to a New York 
statute that treated unmarried biological parents differently with 
respect to consent to adoption.
113
 While Abdiel Caban and Maria 
Mohammed were living together and holding themselves out as 
husband and wife they had two children: David, in 1969, and Denise 
in 1971.
114
 Caban was listed as the children’s father on their birth 
certificates.
115
 The children lived with Caban until December 1973, 
when their mother moved out and married Kazin Mohammed in 
January 1974.
116
 Caban was able to see the children every weekend 
for the ensuing nine months because their maternal grandmother 
permitted him to do so.
117
 In September 1974, the children’s 
maternal grandmother took the children to Puerto Rico to live with 
her, with the plan that the Mohammeds would join them once they 
had saved enough money for a business.
118
 
Instead, Caban traveled to Puerto Rico where their maternal 
grandmother permitted him to take the kids for a visit, but Caban 
returned to New York with the children.
119
 When she was unable to 
secure the children’s return from Caban, Mohammed filed a custody 
 
 112. In responding to Quilloin’s equal protection argument, the Court found that his interests 
were readily distinguishable from a separated or divorced father because although he was subject 
to the same child support obligation, “he never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, he 
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, 
protection, or care of the child.” Id. at 256. What the Court says next is telling, however, as it 
observed that Quilloin “does not complain of his exemption from these responsibilities and, 
indeed, he does not even now seek custody of his child. In contrast, legal custody of children 
is . . . a central aspect of the marital relationship, and even a father whose marriage has broken 
apart will have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of the 
marriage.” Id. Again, the Court makes stereotypical assumptions about what a real father in a real 
family looks like and defers to the other aspect of this relationship—money. 
 113. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381–82 (1979). 
 114. Id. at 382. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 383. 
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proceeding in New York.
120
 Then, both parents and their respective 
spouses petitioned to adopt the children in early 1976.
121
 
After a hearing and testimony, the court granted the 
Mohammeds’ petition terminating Caban’s parental rights and 
obligations.
122
 The surrogate based his decision on a New York 
statute that did not require an unwed father’s consent to the adoption 
of his children, although he was entitled to an opportunity to be 
heard.
123
 Conversely, Caban was not entitled to adopt his own 
children because Mohammed, as the children’s biological mother, 
was permitted to object.
124
 
The Supreme Court found that it was clear the New York statute 
treated unmarried parents differently based solely on their sex.
125
 The 
Supreme Court then found that such a distinction did not serve an 
important governmental objective based on the children’s age, 
particularly in a case such as this one where the children had 
developed a relationship with Caban.
126
 Thus, the Court rejected a 
broad, gender-based distinction based on any “universal difference 
between maternal and paternal relations at every phase of a child’s 
development.”
127
 The Court also found the justification that such a 
distinction supported the state’s interest in adoption of illegitimate 
children failed because the distinction did not bear a substantial 




In his dissent, Justice Stewart took issue with affording unwed 
fathers rights equal to unwed mothers because of the special needs of 




 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 383–84. 
 123. Id. at 384. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 388. 
 126. Id. at 389. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 391–93. The Court noted that an unmarried father’s consent had never been 
required in New York, although parental consent had been required since the late 19th century. 
Id. at 390 n.8. The Court observed that there were no legislative reports explaining the reason for 
the choice to exclude unmarried fathers from the consent requirements. Id. The Court 
acknowledged, however, that one New York court found if unwed fathers’ consent were required 
the adoption might be delayed or eliminated because of the “unavailability” of the natural father. 
Id. at 390 (quoting In re Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486, 490–91 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975)). 
 129. Id. at 395.  
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Justice Stewart observed that the validity of a father’s parental claims 
is traditionally determined based upon whether there is a legitimate 
familial relationship with the child’s mother through marriage.
130
 In 
other words, if a biological father is not married to the child’s 
mother, his parental rights may not receive constitutional 
protection.
131
 In Justice Stewart’s view, the lack of a legal tie to the 
biological mother provided a constitutionally valid ground for the 
distinction and the loss of a biological father’s constitutional rights 
without further consideration.
132
 He further explained that when a 
mother’s and father’s wishes about the child conflict, “the absence of 
a legal tie with the mother may in such circumstances appropriately 
place a limit on whatever substantive constitutional claims might 




While Caban ultimately was able to protect his relationship with 
his children, the case is troubling because he was the biological 
father who had been living with his children, who was forced to seek 
adoption to assert his rights against a stepfather.
134
 Caban is arguably 
an anomaly because it was really a custody battle dressed in adoptive 
clothes. Unfortunately, given the structure of the adoption statutes in 
New York at the time, the advantage was decidedly with 
Mohammed, and she had legal power to completely sever Caban’s 
connection with his children, an advantage she would not have had if 
they were married.
135
 While she might have curtailed his access to 
the children, he would still have been their father, and would still 
have been entitled to access if they had been previously married.
136
 
Even more troubling is that this case was not about visitation, 
who would have primary custody, who got to talk to the children on 
the phone, or who could be involved in the children’s school 
functions. This was an all-or-nothing decision with Caban’s 
relationship with his children hanging in the balance. Justice Stewart 
was contemplating a complete termination of a father’s relationship 
 
 130. Id. at 397. 
 131. Id. (“The Constitution does not require that an unmarried father’s substantive parental 
rights must always be coextensive with those afforded to fathers of legitimate children.”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 397. 
 134. Id. at 380. 
 135. Id. at 385–87. 
 136. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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with his children, no matter how significant, and the loss of that 
father’s constitutional right to the care, custody, and companionship 
of those children. Thus, if an unwed biological father disagrees with 
the biological mother and she chooses to end that relationship, as 
occurred in Quilloin, regardless of the relationship between parent 
and child, in most circumstances, the Court is not reluctant to give 
that father “less constitutional protection.”
137
 
What becomes apparent upon a reading of both dissents is that 
the justices were more preoccupied with removing a child’s stigma 
of illegitimacy than in protecting the constitutional right of that 
child’s father to be a part of that child’s life.
138
 Both dissents discuss 
“custody” of the child at birth.
139
 While there may be a justification 
for having the biological mother maintain presumptive custody of a 
child under these circumstances, there is a significant difference 
between designating presumptive custody—and perhaps collateral 
visitation issues—and the absolute termination of parental rights 
without consent. 
Caban stands in stark contrast to the other cases involving 
competing interests and desires between unwed biological fathers 
and mothers in that the Court chose to award the natural father rights 
based on the preexisting, significant relationship he maintained with 
his children. However, the ever-present discussion of marriage 
reflects a presumption that unmarried fathers are different. 
c.  Lehr v. Robertson 
In 1983, the Supreme Court again took up the issue of the proper 
level of protection required when an unwed biological father’s 
attempt to exercise his parental rights conflicted with the desires of 
the child’s biological mother.
140
 The case involved the termination of 
an unwed biological father’s parental rights in favor of a stepparent 




 137. This is unfortunate because given an unwed biological father’s vulnerable position vis a 
vis a biological mother who has conflicting views, and his vulnerable status as an “unmarried” 
father, he arguably requires more protection in order to properly exercise his parental rights, not 
less. 
 138. Id. at 402–04 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 394–401 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 401–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 140. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 248–49 (1983). 
 141. Id. at 250.  
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Jonathan Lehr and Lorraine Robertson had a daughter, Jessica, 
out of wedlock on November 9, 1976.
142
 Lehr lived with Robertson 
prior to Jessica’s birth and visited her in the hospital when Jessica 
was born, but he did not live with them after Jessica was born, nor 
did he provide financial support or, as the Court noted, “offer to 
marry” Lorraine.
143




Lorraine married Richard Robertson eight months after Jessica 
was born and on December 21, 1978, the Robertsons filed an 
adoption petition in Ulster County, New York.
145
 Lehr was given no 
notice of the proceeding.
146
 However, approximately one month 
later, Lehr filed a “visitation and paternity petition” in Westchester 
County, seeking a determination of paternity, an order of support, 
and reasonable visitation privileges.
147
 Lorraine received notice of 
this proceeding in February 1979.
148
 On March 3, 1979, Lehr 
received notice of the pending adoption proceeding for the first 
time.
149
 However, Lehr was advised on March 7, 1979, that, despite 
his pending paternity action, the judge in Ulster County had signed 
the adoption order.
150
 Because of the order of adoption, Lehr’s 
paternity action was dismissed.
151
 
Lehr challenged the adoption order on several grounds, but each 
New York court that reviewed the case found that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in signing the order without providing notice 
to Lehr, even in light of the pending paternity action.
152
 
Lehr advanced two arguments before the Supreme Court, each 
challenging the constitutionality of the New York statutes that did 
not require notice to a putative father who did not satisfy the state’s 
recognition requirements. First, he argued that a putative father’s 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 252. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 250. 
 146. Id. at 248. 
 147. Id. at 252. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 253. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 253–55. The Court of Appeals also specifically found that Caban, which was 
decided by the Supreme Court about two months after the entry of adoption, was inapplicable 
because it was not retroactive. Id. at 254. 
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actual or potential relationship with his child is a liberty interest that 
could not be destroyed without due process.
153
 Second, he argued 
that the “gender-based classifications in the statute, which both 
denied him the right to consent to Jessica’s adoption and accorded 




The Court, again focusing on the family as the place from which 
parental rights emanate, stated that 
[t]he institution of marriage has played a critical role both in 
defining the legal entitlements of family members and in 
developing the decentralized structure of our democratic 
society. In recognition of that role, and as part of their 
general overarching concern for serving the best interests of 
children, state laws almost universally express an 
appropriate preference for the formal family.
155
 
The opening line of Justice Stevens’s opinion is, once again, 
quite telling: “The question presented is whether New York has 
sufficiently protected an unmarried father’s inchoate relationship 
with a child whom he has never supported and rarely seen in the two 
years since her birth.”
156
 Lehr may have been absent from Jessica’s 
life for a period of time, but the underlying facts indicate that Lehr 
was seeking both a determination of paternity and visitation with 
Jessica when her mother and stepfather sought to have her 
adopted.
157
 And, of course, Justice Stevens does not acknowledge the 
whole story when framing the issue factually.
158
 
The Court, relying on Justice Stewart’s opinion in Caban, drew 
a distinction between the “developed parent-child relationship” in 
Stanley and Caban, and the potential relationship in Quilloin and 
Lehr to explain how an unwed biological father must prove his 
 
 153. Id. at 255. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 256–57. This begs the question as to why this preference is “appropriate” and 
what, of course, is a “formal” family. And, if the formal family is so critical to society, then why 
permit divorce or, more importantly, remarriage thereafter? 
 156. Id. at 249–50. I would suggest Justice Stevens’s framing of the issue reflects an inherent 
bias against unwed fathers; here, yet again, Justice Stevens is exposing just another deadbeat 
scofflaw dad who failed to marry the mother of his child and now wants the Equal Protection 
Clause to protect his relationship with that child. 
 157. Id. at 252. 
 158. Id. at 267–68. 
THE TIES THAT BIND 10/92/2014 10:51 AM 
Fall 2014] THE TIES THAT BIND 253 
parental rights deserve constitutional protection.
159
 In the Court’s 
view the “mere existence of a biological link” did not merit 
equivalent constitutional protection, a constitutional protection that is 
afforded to biological mothers and married fathers, even if they later 
separate or divorce from the child’s mother, and even if they are not 
the child’s biological father.
160
 
The Court expressed the distinction, and the test for “biology 
plus,”
161
 as follows: “When an unwed father demonstrates his full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘coming 
forward to participate in the rearing of his child,’ his interest in 
personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under 
the due process clause.”
162
 The basis for the distinction, according to 
Justice Stevens, is “the importance of the familial relationship, to the 
individuals involved and to the society, stem[ming] from the 
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily 
association, and from the role it plays in promoting a way of life 




In addressing Lehr’s equal protection claim, the Court noted that 
the interest in efficient adoption procedures in New York was of vital 
importance, in part, because “illegitimate children whose parents 
never marry are ‘at risk’ economically, medically, emotionally, and 
educationally.”
164
 The Court held that “[i]f one parent has an 
established custodial relationship with the child, and the other parent 
has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal 
 
 159. Id. at 261. I would actually take issue with the Court’s characterization of the 
relationship in Quilloin as a “potential” relationship. Quilloin was present in his child’s life and to 
such an extent that the child expressed a preference to continue seeing Quilloin. Quilloin is more 
aptly characterized as a preference of a marital family unit over a natural family unit. And, in that 
sense, it is more like Caban than Lehr. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Carbone, supra note 27, at 1132.  
 162. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. 
 163. Id. (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231–33 (1972))). It is interesting that the 
Court chooses to cite this passage from Foster Families and Yoder. Both cases involved 
protection of the family unit in terms of raising children, they did not deal with the loss of 
parental rights. In those cases, the Court was protecting the parents’ rights from State 
interference, not choosing marriage over biology and determining who was a parent. Foster 
Families, 431 U.S. 816; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 
 164. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266 n.25 (citing E. CRELLIN ET AL., BORN ILLEGITIMATE: SOCIAL AND 
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 96–112 (1971)).  
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Protection Clause does not prevent a state from according the two 
parents different legal rights.”
165
 
The dissent’s recitation of the facts in Lehr illustrates why 
basing a fundamental right to due process and equal protection with 
respect to parental rights on a “developed relationship” is fraught 
with peril:  
According to Lehr, Lorraine acknowledged to friends and 
relatives that Lehr was Jessica’s father. Lorraine told Lehr 
that she had reported to the New York Department of Social 
Services that he was the father. Lehr visited Lorraine and 
Jessica every day during Lorraine’s confinement. 
According to Lehr, from the time Lorraine was discharged 
from the hospital until August, 1978, she concealed her 
whereabouts from him. During this time Lehr never ceased 
his efforts to locate Lorraine and Jessica and achieved 
sporadic success until August, 1977, after which time he 
was unable to locate them at all. On those occasions when 
he did determine Lorraine’s location, he visited with her 
and her children to the extent she was willing to permit it. 
When Lehr, with the aid of a detective agency, located 
Lorraine and Jessica in August 1978, Lorraine was already 
married to Mr. Robertson, Lehr asserts that at this time he 
offered to provide financial assistance and to set up a trust 
fund for Jessica, but that Lorraine refused. Lorraine 
threatened Lehr with arrest unless he stayed away and 
refused to permit him to see Jessica. Thereafter Lehr 
retained counsel who wrote to Lorraine in early December 
1978, requesting she permit Lehr to visit Jessica and 
threatening legal action on Lehr’s behalf. On December 21, 
1978, perhaps as a response to Lehr’s threatened legal 





 165. Id. at 267–68. The problem, of course, is that a biological mother is presumed to have a 
custodial relationship or at a minimum an established relationship with a child by virtue of 
gestation. In that sense, she is treated differently by the State in that she is given rights that are 
not afforded to biological fathers, offending notions of equal protection. Additionally, while the 
Court talks about “different” legal rights for mothers and fathers, the stark reality is that the 
difference is between having any legal rights with regard to one’s children or none at all. 
 166. Id. at 268–69. 
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The appropriate starting point for recognizing a fundamental 
right to due process in the first place should not be the weight of the 
facts in the relevant circumstance, but rather the “nature of the 
interest at stake . . . to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection.”
167
 “The ‘biological connection’ is itself a 
relationship that creates a protected interest” because “the usual 
understanding of ‘family’ implies biological relationships.”
168
 Thus, 
the dissent properly frames the interest as that of a natural parent, not 







3.  Michael H. v. Gerald D.—Unmarried Biological Father of a Child 
Born of a Marriage—In Case You Didn’t Hear It the First Few 




When Michael H. came before the Supreme Court, the Court 
was finally required to deal with competing claims of two fathers 
who both had developed relationships with a child and who would 
otherwise satisfy the Court’s “biology plus” test.
171
 The child, 
Victoria, was born to Carole while she was married to Gerald, but 
from the beginning Carole suspected Michael might be the father as 
 
 167. Id. at 270 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Foster Families, 431 U.S. at 839–42). 
 168. Id. at 272 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster Families, 431 U.S. at 848). 
 169. Id. at 270. 
 170. Brief For Amici Curiae Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children, supra note 5. 
In another circumstance, however, biology’s relevance has been put forth as a reason to deny 
legal protection to those who seek to marry. In United States v. Windsor, BLAG asserted DOMA 
should be upheld because it advanced child welfare by: “(1) providing a stable structure to raise 
unintended and unplanned offspring; (2) encouraging the rearing of children by their biological 
parents; and (3) promoting childrearing by both a mother and father.” Id. (citation omitted). 
Amici argued that each of these justifications expressed and enforced a “bare preference for the 
children of opposite-sex couples as the only children entitled to permanency, stability and so-
called ‘ideal’ parenting arrangements.” Id. Amici further argued that these justifications drew 
“invidious distinctions between families headed by opposite-sex parents and families headed by 
same-sex parents” in violation of equal protection. Id. 
 171. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113–14 (1989).  
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After her birth, both fathers held Victoria out as their 
daughter.
173
 Both fathers resided with Victoria at different times 
during the first two years of her life.
174
 In November 1982, Michael 
filed a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish 
paternity and visitation after Carole denied him access to Victoria.
175
 
Victoria also filed a claim, asserting she had more than one 
“psychological or de facto father” and that she was entitled to 
maintain her relationships with both.
176
 
In May 1983, Carole filed a motion for summary judgment in 
the action but removed it from the calendar in August of the same 
year when she and Michael reconciled.
177
 In June 1984, Carole once 
again reconciled with Gerald and moved to New York, where they 
lived together and had two additional children.
178
 However, in May 




In October 1984, Gerald filed a motion for summary judgment 
claiming there were no triable issues of fact because, under 
California law, he was “conclusively presumed” to be Victoria’s 
father.
180
 At the time, under California law, a child born to a married 
woman living with her husband was presumed to be a child of the 
 
 172. Id. The affair began in the summer of 1978 and Victoria was born in May 1981. Id. at 
113. 
 173. Id. at 113–14. Gerald was listed as Victoria’s father on her birth certificate. Id. at 113. A 
paternity test confirmed Michael was Victoria’s biological father in October 1981. Id. at 114. 
 174. Id. Gerald moved to New York in October 1981, leaving Carole and Victoria in 
California. Victoria lived with Michael from January 1982 to March 1982, until Carole took her 
back to California where she began living with another man. Id. Later that year, Carole and 
Victoria stayed with Gerald again, and then Carole took Victoria back to live with Scott in 
California. Id. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. 
 177. During the intervening months, Carole had been residing with Gerald in New York. In 
August, she returned to California where Michael resided with she and Victoria for the next eight 
months. Id.  
 178. Id. at 115. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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marriage.
181
 The presumption could only be challenged by the 
husband or wife under limited circumstances.
182
 
The California court found in Gerald’s favor and cut off 
Michael’s visitation rights in order to protect the “integrity of the 
family unit.”
183
 Michael appealed, claiming that the application of 
section 621 violated his procedural and due process rights.
184
 The 
superior court’s ruling was affirmed.
185
 
Michael did not raise an equal protection challenge until he 
came before the Supreme Court.
186
 Because he failed to raise the 




Justice Scalia framed the issue of deciding who had a right to be 
recognized as Victoria’s father as an all-or-nothing proposition 
observing that “California law, like nature itself, makes no provision 
for dual fatherhood.”
188
 Thus, Michael either received all the rights, 
or Gerald received all the rights. 
The Court skipped over procedural due process concerns 
because either way Michael, who was an “adulterous natural father,” 
was not entitled to a hearing. Instead, the majority focused on 
substantive due process and the adequacy of the fit between the 
classification and the policy it served.
189
 Turning to Michael’s 
substantive due process claims, Justice Scalia addressed whether 
Michael had a “constitutionally protected liberty interest” in his 
 
 181. Id. at 113 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1989). 
 182. The Code provided that the presumption could be rebutted by blood tests within two 
years from the child’s birth, either by the husband or the wife. Id. at 115 (citing EVID. § 621(c)–
(d)). A natural father had no statutory right to bring a claim independent of the husband or wife. 
Id. 
 183. Id. at 115–16. 
 184. Id. at 116. Victoria claimed, in part, that her inability to rebut the presumption violated 
her equal protection rights. Id. 
 185. Id. The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Id. 
 186. Id. at 116–117. However, both Michael and Victoria raised due process challenges and 
Victoria raised an equal protection claim of her own. Id. at 116. 
 187. Id. at 116–17. “We do not reach Michael’s equal protection claim . . . as it was neither 
raised nor passed upon below.” Id. (citing Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 
(1988)). 
 188. Id. at 118. As noted earlier, apparently California has surpassed nature and found a way 
to recognize more than two parents in a child’s life. Not to be outdone, Louisiana actually beat 
California to it. See State ex rel. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Howard, 898 So. 2d 443, 444 (La. 2004) 
(recognizing the concept of “dual paternity” for support purposes). 
 189. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 120–21 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 
652 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 456–59 (1973)).  
THE TIES THAT BIND 10/92/2014 10:51 AM 
258 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:223 
relationship with Victoria that trumped the state’s interest in 
protecting Carole and Gerald’s marital union.
190
 
The majority narrowly framed the contours of the “lock” into 
which Michael’s “key” would have to fit. After laying the 
groundwork by noting the “treacherous field” the Court had to 
navigate in addressing claims like Michael’s, the Court held that the 
mechanism for unlocking Michael’s parental rights must be based on 
a liberty interest that was fundamental and that it also be an interest 
“traditionally” protected by society.
191
 
Having been required to demonstrate the asserted right was 
properly rooted in tradition, Michael cited to Stanley, Quilloin, 
Caban, and Lehr as opinions establishing that he had a liberty 
interest recognized by the Supreme Court, because both biological 
fatherhood and an established parental relationship were present.
192
 
The majority took issue with Michael’s reading of those cases, 
explaining that they instead rested upon the “historic respect—
indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term—traditionally 
accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary 
family.”
193
 “The family unit accorded traditional respect in our 
society, which we have referred to as the ‘unitary family,’ is typified, 
of course, by the marital family, but also includes the household of 
unmarried parents and their children.”
194
 Thus, that “unitary family” 
could not include Michael and Victoria, or Michael and Victoria and 




The Supreme Court conceded that the concept could be 
expanded perhaps, but could not be stretched so far as to “include the 
relationship established between a married woman, her lover, and 
 
 190. Id. at 121. 
 191. Id. at 122–23. “As we have put it, the Due Process Clause affords only those protections 
‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental.’” Id. (citing 
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Our cases reflect “continual insistence upon 
respect for the teaching of our history” and “solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our 
society . . . .” Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)). 
 192. Id. at 123. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 123 n.3. While the Court notes that unmarried parents and their children may 
constitute a “unitary family” entitled to protection, it appears that the Court has declined to extend 
that protection to unmarried fathers when a married stepfather is available as a replacement. See, 
e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 195. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124. It also means the Court declined to recognize single parent 
families as family units entitled to similar protections. 
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their child, during a 3-month sojourn in St. Thomas, or during a 
subsequent 8-month period when, if he happened to be in Los 
Angeles, he stayed with her and the child.”
196
 What the Court failed 
to acknowledge, however, was that during these sojourns and 
reconciliations, the unitary family it ultimately chose to protect did 
not exist in the “traditional” sense.
197
 Gerald resided in New York, 
and when Carole was not residing with Gerald, she was either living 
with Michael or another man.
198
 
In Michael H., once again, the “traditional” marital unit was 
favored at the expense of individual parental rights, rendering any 
biological connection, or even a developed relationship, with a child 
moot when put up against a marriage.
199
 In taking the majority to 
task for its rigid and narrow construction of “tradition” in this 
context, Justice Brennan noted that even if such an analysis might be 
otherwise appropriate, adherence to any one view of tradition should 
not be so static and rigid.
200
 
Further, the majority chose to focus on the legal presumption 
tied to marriage when, often, that presumption was used because no 
other determinant was available to establish lineage and to protect 
individuals within a marriage.
201
 What happened, as in the cases 
before, is that the marriage received constitutional protection, not the 
 
 196. Id. at 123 n.3. 
 197. Id. at 113–14 (1989). Again, in part, the Court seemed to be preoccupied with the 
behavior of the parties, focusing on the adulterous nature of Carole and Michael’s relationship 
and ignoring the reality of Carole and Gerald’s legally preferred relationship. 
 198. Id. The reality is that had Carole been unmarried, or even married Gerald after Victoria’s 
birth, Michael would have had constitutionally protected rights that he did not have because 
Carole was married to someone else when Victoria was born. 
 199. Id. at 115. Again, there is a push and pull between recognizing the sanctity of the 
“family” in relation to the exercise of parental rights, but then crafting such a narrow vision of 
what a family can be that entire classes of parents, specifically fathers, are left with little or no 
constitutional protection. As Justice Brennan rightly observed, only a “pinched conception of ‘the 
family’” would exclude Michael, Carole, and Victoria from protection. Id. at 144–45 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
 200. Id. at 138. Even if everyone could agree on “the content and significance of particular 
traditions, we would still be forced to identify the point at which a tradition becomes firm enough 
to be relevant to our definition of liberty and the moment at which it becomes too obsolete to be 
relevant any longer.” Id. Traditions, by their very nature, evolve and change. At one time, 
ownership of persons in the form of slavery, indentured servitude, and even “ownership” of 
children were traditions as well. 
 201. Id. at 125–26 (plurality opinion). Part of the tradition of the presumption, however, was 
that it was intended to protect the biological parents in the marriage and their offspring and to 
make assumptions in the absence of any other evidence to the contrary. The fact that the 
presumption itself has evolved over time is evidence of its purpose not being solely to protect 
marriage itself. 
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individuals who had an individual liberty interest in being a parent, 
regardless of marital status.
202
 Instead, underlying prejudices about 
“adulterous natural fathers” served to sever the constitutionally 
protected connection between parent and child. Thus, the Court 
framed the parameters of parental rights in such a tortuous way as to 
sever Michael’s connection with Victoria in favor of the “correct” 
form of family. 
C.  Paternity and Equal Protection—The Disconnect Between 
Natural Fathers’ Individual Rights and the Rights of a Marriage 
For the purposes of equal protection, “[t]he sovereign may not 
draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences 
that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.”
203
 It may 
not treat men and women differently when “there is no substantial 
relationship between the disparity and an important state purpose.”
204
 
“Sex-based generalizations both reflect and reinforce ‘fixed notions 
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.’”
205
 “Such 
generalizations must be viewed not in isolation, but in the context of 




 202. Id. at 124. (“Thus, the legal issue . . . reduces to whether the relationship between 
persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has been treated as a protected family unit under 
the historic practices of our society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded special 
protection. We think it impossible to find it has. In fact, quite to the contrary, our traditions have 
protected the marital family against the sort of claim Michael asserts.”). While this is true in some 
sense, framing the “family” Michael and Victoria are part of as “adulterous father and 
legitimately born child into traditional marital unit of mother and father,” certainly skews the lens 
in a way that did a significant injustice to Michael and Victoria. It also is at odds with Justice 
Scalia’s more recent observation that an unmarried biological father who may have 
unintentionally relinquished his rights to parent had a right to raise his biological child where a 
loving “traditional family” sought to adopt her. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 
2572 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Clearly, the father in that case was not part of a “traditional 
family unit” contemplated by the majority in Michael H. 
 203. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983) (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 
(1971)). 
 204. Id. at 265–66; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–99 (1976) (“[C]lassifications 
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”). 
 205. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (quoting Miss. Univ. For Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). 
 206. Id. (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (quoting Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 US 677, 684 (1973))).  
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A parent’s relationship with his child is constitutionally 
protected.
207
 “[A] natural parent’s ‘desire for and right to the 
“companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her 
children” is an interest far more precious than any property right.’”
208
 
This liberty interest does not disappear when the parents cannot 
satisfy the legal requirements of parenthood, and “[e]ven when blood 
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing 
the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”
209
 The guarantees of 
the Bill of Rights protect “individual decisions in matters of 
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.”
210
 
The problem with much of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on fathers’ rights is that of perspective and focus. First, the Court 
favors the rights of a marriage more than those of the individuals 
who may or may not be married.
211
 This means that instead of 
protecting individuals’ rights to bear and parent their children, the 
Court is protecting a marital unit and offering more protection to 
those fathers who assert their parental rights from within the marital 
unit than those fathers who choose not to marry, or are unable to 
marry, in the first place.
212
 This creates a secondary problem because 
if there is a right to marry, it logically follows that there is a right not 
 
 207. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231–33 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 166 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (affirming an individual’s right to 
bring up children under Fourteenth Amendment as one of many rights an individual enjoys). 
 208. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social 
Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972))). 
 209. Id. at 753. 
 210. Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Carey v. 
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977)).  
 211. Justice Stevens suggests that such impositions are acceptable because they give “loving” 
fathers an incentive to marry the mother. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 407 (1979). No 
other biological parent is required to make any such showing; indeed, the only other people who 
are required to do so are non-biological parents who seek to adopt, who intend to procreate via 
surrogacy, or those who are otherwise not biological parents but are intimately connected to a 
child’s familial unit. Arguably, the very act of pursuing adoption or surrogacy triggers the same 
type of treatment from the court that is normally reserved for biological mothers and married 
biological fathers. For instance, in an Arizona surrogacy case, the court noted that an intended 
non-gestational biological mother had to be given the opportunity to develop a relationship with 
the children she sought to parent. Soos, 897 P.2d at 1360–61. The court found the developed 
relationship test of Lehr inapplicable in the surrogacy context, focusing instead on the mother’s 
biological connection to protect her fundamental liberty interest. Id. 
 212. Martha Fineman has explored the tension and distinctions drawn between marital or 
familial privacy and individual privacy, noting that the latter is a much newer concept and the 
former a more generalized protection. Martha Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 
WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1212, 1216 (1999) [hereinafter Family Privacy].  
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to marry.
213
 The result is that the Court bestows constitutional rights 
upon a legal relationship in lieu of protecting individuals’ rights upon 
which the constitutional protection is based.
214
 
Second, in terms of equal protection, the law has evolved to 
protect similarly situated parents differently. While the underlying 
right is inchoate, that right is fully vested in a biological mother 
when she gives birth, in the form of custody. Custody at birth affords 
the biological mother legal recognition of her unrealized relationship 
with her child and does not require a developed relationship to assert 
her rights as a parent. She need not marry to gain these rights. 
Married men are also afforded protection at the time of birth, 
regardless of genetic relation, in the form of custody as well. The law 
confers parenthood on them to the exclusion of all others, without 
demonstration of anything further. However, unwed biological 
fathers receive less protection when their biological child is born, 
and in order to receive that protection they must affirmatively 
demonstrate they intend to parent and that they have been intimately 
involved both before and after their child is born.  
Biological fathers who father a child that is born to someone 
else’s intact marriage have even less protection. To the extent they 
are permitted to assert their rights at all, they are limited by time and 
by their affirmative acts. But they are also at the mercy of the actions 
and the desires of the two other “parents” that are involved. Nothing 
contemplates the dynamics of the relationships between the various 
adults involved in the child’s life at birth when requiring such 
affirmative acts. 
A biological father is imbued with no legally cognizable rights 
without affirmative action on his part, and if he does not act 
 
 213. See generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (unconstitutional to require 
indigent to pay court fees to get a divorce).   
 214. In another context, the Court found that the distinction between married persons and 
individuals was unconstitutional with respect to fundamental rights. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1972) (addressing an individual’s right to contraception). “[T]he marital couple is not 
an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each 
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right to privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Id. 
at 453. In citing Eisenstadt in her examination of family privacy, Fineman notes parenthetically 
that Eisenstadt confirmed an individual right of access to contraception, finding that a distinction 
between married and single persons with respect to that right was unconstitutional. Family 
Privacy, supra note 212, at 1212 n.36 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1423 (2d ed. 1988)). 
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appropriately or quickly enough, his constitutional right to parent can 
be terminated—sometimes without his knowledge. This gender-
based distinction is based in large part on a stereotypical view of 
unmarried biological fathers as unintentional and unwilling parents. 
It offends notions of equal protection to require unwed 
biological fathers to affirmatively avow their connection to their 
child in a prescribed socially acceptable way, which may include 
resorting to the court system, in order to have their relationship 
legally recognized, when married fathers and all mothers have no 
comparable requirement.
215
 To permit an unwed biological father’s 
parental rights to be terminated without notice or after the passage of 
time also violates equal protection. Affording a biological father no 
cognizable parental rights or limiting those rights when the child is 
born to an intact marriage of the biological mother and another man 
is even worse. While these relationships between a married couple 
and someone outside the marriage can be complicated, the 
relationship between natural parent and child should be recognized. 
It may be necessary for the law to acknowledge a “legal” father by 
presumption for ease of identifying a “father” for a child, but it 
should not be able to do so at the expense of that child’s biological 
father’s constitutional right to parent. 
This illuminates another, yet different, misstep in the protection 
of natural fathers’ individual rights. The presumption continues to be 
that children can only have two parents although, in recent years, the 
traditional nuclear family has been supplanted by the blended, 
stepparent, and even multigenerational families. To continue to place 
this limitation on the courts no longer makes sense. It is all the more 
difficult given the context in which these decisions are made, as the 
courts attempt to balance and award competing parties a right to be a 
part of child’s life and there are, quite literally, winners and losers. 
For example, in Michael H., the Supreme Court felt that it had to 
choose between the families created by Michael H. and Gerald D. 
 
 215. This is at odds with the Supreme Court’s position, taken in other instances, recognizing 
the right of individuals to be independent and nonconforming. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 
405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972). In addressing a law prohibiting loitering and living off the earnings of 
a wife, Justice Douglas noted that the Court has “honored the right to be nonconformists and the 
right to defy submissiveness.” Id.; see also Michael H. v. Gerard D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“We are not an assimilative, homogenous society, but a facilitative, 
pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else’s unfamiliar or even repellant 
practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies.”). 
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Why? Because the default built into our legal system is that children 
can only have two “legal” parents.
216
 It was framed by the Court as 
an all-or-nothing proposition for each father, and the Court sided not 
with Gerald so much as with his marriage. Imagine instead if the 
Court had recognized both Michael H. as the biological father and 
given him a seat at the table, and recognized Gerald D. as the legal 
father and given him a seat at the table as well. Then, after all three 
parents had been identified, the lower court could have fashioned a 
visitation and custody arrangement that allowed Victoria to have a 
meaningful relationship with every parent in her life and that could 
have included a consideration of her best interests.
217
 Making a shift 
such as this would bring more caregivers, socially, legally, and 
financially, into Victoria’s life. 
It is at that point that Michael H.’s actions, or Quilloin’s actions, 
or Caban’s actions, would become relevant in fashioning a custody 
or visitation schedule. Each father’s affirmative acts, his attempts to 
develop a relationship, would be protected by the court just as every 
other parental relationship is protected in every divorce or paternity 
proceeding there is. To do otherwise is to continue to perpetuate the 
one thing the Court has said it should not do—choose “better” 
parents for a child instead of recognizing the parents of the child.
218
 
Compounding the problem is that “married” is deemed “better.”
219
 If 
we cannot choose “better” parents, then that logic must extend to not 
choosing married parents for a child over an unmarried biological 
 
 216. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing child could 
have two legal mothers, but not more than two parents); In re M.C., 195 Cal. App. 4th 197 (2011) 
(holding child could not have more than two legal parents); see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 
776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (recognizing only one natural mother for a child). But see 2013 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 564 (SB 274) (West) (recognizing instances where a child may have more than two 
legal parents). 
 217. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(3)(d) (West 2004) (“In cases where a child has 
more than two parents, the court shall allocate custody and visitation among the parents based on 
the best interest of the child, including, but not limited to, addressing the child’s need for 
continuity and stability by preserving established patterns of care and emotional bonds. The court 
may order that not all parents share legal or physical custody of the child if the court finds that it 
would not be in the best interest of the child as provided in Sections 3011 and 3020.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2572 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Similar threads appear in the debate over same-sex marriage. For example, the 
argument children are better off raised by their married biological parents. 
 219. See Judith Koons, Motherhood, Marriage and Morality: The Pro-Marriage Moral 
Discourse of American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2004). Koons notes that in the 
“family values agenda” “marriage is lauded as the bulwark of the social order and the seedbed of 
virtue upon which the Republic rests.” Id. at 23 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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father. Otherwise, it would be just as easy to remove any child from 
any single parent, mother or father, in favor of married parents who 
want to raise the child. 
At the end of the day, where the Supreme Court gets it wrong, 
and where it does not properly address the equal protection concerns 
raised, is that it fails to protect the inchoate relationship. It does not 
recognize the difference the difference makes. The difference 
between the genders is not that women are natural caregivers and 
men natural breadwinners, or that women are naturally better parents 
than men with better instincts, or that married fathers are better 
fathers than unmarried fathers, or that unmarried fathers are not real 
parents. Instead, the difference is that women carry a conceived 
pregnancy to term and give birth, and men do not; as such, their 
inchoate relationship is the most easily protected of the two. 
The difference that difference makes is that how the law 
recognizes that inchoate relationship between parent and child, and 
how the law protects both men’s and women’s parental rights, must 
necessarily be accomplished in different ways. The problem is that 
the Court has seen fit to treat unmarried biological fathers outside of 
a marital relationship differently simply because they are not married 
to the biological mother at the time of the child’s birth. The law does 
not protect an unmarried biological father’s inchoate right to a 
relationship with his child in the same way it does for both mothers 
and married fathers, but it should. In fact, it should all the more 
because a father does not give birth and cannot rely on a legal 
relationship with the child’s mother to protect his rights. 
The law should affirmatively protect a biological father’s right 
to parent to the same extent any other biological parent’s right is 
protected. Only then will an unmarried biological father receive 
equal protection. It does not mean a natural father receives custody at 
birth, but that he is entitled to the care, custody, and companionship 
of his child until he voluntarily relinquishes that right or he is 
otherwise deemed unfit, just like any other parent. 
IV.  ADOPTING A NEW APPROACH—WHY DO  
WE NEED TO CHANGE? 
In addition to the equal protection problems raised by the 
presumption and the preference of marital rights versus individual 
rights, the reality is that the “traditions” that have served as the basis 
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for the presumption no longer reflect societal realities. Stereotypical 
understandings of fathers, parents, and marriage can no longer stand 
in the fact of these realities. Reflecting on these changes 
demonstrates that there is an urgent need to move away from 
presumptions tied to paternity as legal determinants. 
A.  Fathers Have Changed, But the Stereotypes  
Attached to Them Have Not 
While on the one hand society has recognized that a father’s 
interest in having a child is a fundamental right, society still imposes 
outdated stereotypes on what a father wants, or is willing to do, 
based upon his legal relationship with the mother when the child is 
born.
220
 This is fundamentally unfair. “With each passing year, 
researchers have documented how fathers are more involved in their 
children’s lives than fathers of previous generations.”
221
 
Approximately 85 percent of fathers are present at the birth of 
their child.
222
 About 80 percent have a relationship with the child and 
the child’s mother at birth, and by the time the child is five years of 
age, approximately 51 percent remain.
223
 The number of  
single-father homes has also increased exponentially, even though 
the overall number is still small compared to family units headed by 
 
 220. Kisthardt notes that in penning Michael H., the plurality also repeatedly refers to 
Michael H. as the “adulterous father” and, while not overtly pointing to marriage as the protected 
relationship, clearly sets the outer limit of an unwed father’s constitutionally protected liberty 
interest at the threshold of the marital family unit. Kisthardt, supra note 4, at 621. Thus, the 
reality is, had Carole, the mother in Michael H., been unmarried, or had later married Gerald, 
Michael H. would have had a constitutionally protected liberty interest based solely on his genetic 
connection to Victoria and his efforts to establish a relationship. Instead, a third party’s behavior 
determined his rights, and that person is no less culpable for the adulterous behavior, but does not 
suffer any of the same consequences. Further, if the legal father does not want the honor of being 
that child’s father, he may challenge paternity and have his status changed. It is hard to 
understand why the court would limit what had clearly been recognized as a constitutionally 
protected right by leaving the ability to enforce that right to the whim and caprice of others. 
 221. Andrea Doucet, Dad and Baby in the First Year: Gendered Responsibilities and 
Embodiment, 624 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 78, 79 (2009). In advocating for a shift 
in caregiving, Doucet focuses on what moves fathers to feel responsible and to be responsible for 
the caregiving duties of domestic life and parenthood. Id.  
 222. See FRAGILE FAMILIES AND CHILD WELLBEING STUDY FACT SHEET 1 [hereinafter 
FRAGILE FAMILIES], available at http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/documents 
/FragileFamiliesandChildWellbeingStudyFactSheet.pdf. 
 223. Sara McLanahan & Audrey N. Beck, Parental Relationships in Fragile Families, 
FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2010 at 17, 22.  
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a single mother.
224
 The number of stay-at-home fathers has increased 
as well, challenging the notion that only mothers can act as primary 
caregivers in a child’s life.
225
 
Advocates for social fatherhood have begun to focus on the 
importance of fathers in their children’s lives.
226
 Unfortunately, when 
men express an interest in becoming caregivers, and in taking active 
roles in caregiving, they face a significant social bias as fathers. It is 
not that men do not want to parent but that often society treats them 
as incapable of caregiving.
227
 
The other reality is that biologically a father experiences 
pregnancy differently than a mother. However, just because he is not 
carrying the child does not mean he does not experience significant 
changes or that he does not develop an emotional level of 
responsibility for a child.
228
 Because these are not visible changes, 
very often they are discounted, but studies indicate that expectant 
fathers experience a panoply of emotions with respect to impending 
parenthood no different than a woman. Men simply are not able to 
experience the “embodied world of pregnancy.”
229
 
Fathers who experience the loss of a child via miscarriage, 
however, experience a higher degree of difficulty coping than 
 
 224. GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE RISE OF SINGLE FATHERS, 1–2 
(2013), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/07/single-fathers-07-2013.pdf.  
 225. See Doucet, supra note 221, at 80. In Canada the number of stay-at-home fathers had 
increased 25 percent over a recent ten-year period and there had been a “sixfold increase in the 
proportion of single-earner families with a stay-at-home father between 1976 . . . and 2005.” Id. 
Most of these increases were based on women’s entry into the paid labor market and reflected the 
fact that women had not only moved into the workforce but have also become primary 
breadwinners. Id.  
 226. Nancy Dowd connects caregiving and the concept of nurture with social fatherhood, 
looking not only to economic support or recognition of a child but to the loving, caregiving, 
connection a father builds with his child. Nancy Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and 
Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909 (2006) [hereinafter Parentage at Birth]. 
She proposes that parentage be conferred on a birthfather, as one who is the social father or 
“nurturer,” presuming most times that a birthfather is also the child’s biological father. Id. 
 227. See Doucet, supra note 221, at 89. As one father put it, “Even in a society where people 
believe that men and women are equal and can do just about everything, they don’t really believe 
that men can [care for] a baby, especially a really tiny baby.” Id. 
 228. Doucet speaks of three different types of embodiment a father can experience—
emotional responsibility, community responsibility and moral responsibility. Doucet, supra note 
221, at 84. Emotional responsibility is defined as “attentiveness and responsiveness” or thinking 
about the baby and parental consciousness. Id. I would argue the connection with a child begins 
when a father considers his impending parenthood. While it may be a largely undocumented 
process, intentional parenthood may be no less powerful when conceived in this context. 
 229. Doucet, supra note 221, at 84. 
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women.
230
 Research indicates that men suffer from the same  
post-abortion psychological issues that women do.
231
 Men report 
feeling depression, anxiety, helplessness, and guilt.
232
 While it is true 
that a woman carrying a child will physically bond with that child, 
the reality is that, for a man, the loss is just as palpable as the one 
suffered by the mother.
233
 
Thus, fathers’ shifting roles within caregiving units, as well as 
the less obvious connections a biological father may have with his 
unborn child, must be taken into account when considering how to 
best protect a man’s parental rights. 
B.  Marriage and the Notion of a “Formal Family”  
Has Changed 
The most obvious reason to shift away from the legal 
presumption of paternity as a determining factor in who is a parent, 
and more importantly who is not, is the availability of testing.
234
 
Clearly, we no longer need the presumption to establish lineage as 
we did in feudal England, nor to decide between competing claims of 
paternity when no other way is available. But, as Carbone notes, 
continued adherence to the presumption, particularly as practiced by 
the Supreme Court, involves the “moral force” underlying the 
 
 230. See Marya Burgess, How Miscarriage Can Hit Very Hard, BBC NEWS (Jun. 19, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5082442.stm (noting that the impact on men goes unrecognized and 
that men are stuck between a rock and hard place, socially not permitted to be too emotional or 
too stoic). Men’s grief can also take a different form, with a man trying to problem-solve, take 
action, gather facts, or simply avoid the grief by working. After a Miscarriage: Surviving 
Emotionally, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/pregnancyloss 
/mcsurvivingemotionally.html (last updated Jan. 2014) [hereinafter AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N]. 
 231. See Catherine T. Coyle, Men and Abortion: A Review of Empirical Reports Concerning 
the Impact of Abortion on Men, 3 INTERNET J. MENTAL HEALTH (2007), http://www.ispub.com 
/ostia/index.php?xmlFilePath=journals/ijmh/vol3n2/abortion.xml. 
 232. Id. 
 233. AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, supra note 230 (explaining “[a] woman can begin bonding 
[with a baby] from the moment she has a positive pregnancy test”); Coyle, supra note 231 
(describing the feelings of “worthlessness,” “voicelessness,” and “emasculation” a man 
experiences after learning that his girlfriend had an abortion without informing him). 
 234. “DNA testing now makes it possible to identify the biological parents of every child” 
thereby “[erasing] the historic distinction between fathers and mothers” because, in theory, all can 
be known at birth. Parentage at Birth, supra note 226, at 912. 
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presumption.
235
 Indeed, a normative marital unit (a married mother 
and father) is the preferred child-rearing package.
236
 
However, society does not reflect this presumption anymore. 
Children are raised in multiple familial units with single parents, 
unmarried cohabitating parents, open-adoption relationships 
involving both adoptive parents and biological parents, stepfamilies 
and blended families, and they are raised by heterosexual, lesbian, 
gay, cisgender, intersex, and transgender parents.
237
 Perhaps no other 
field highlights this reality more than assisted reproductive 
technology, which can separate “the genetic, gestational, and social 




 235. Carbone, supra note 27, at 1315; see also Hirczy, supra note 45, at 1644–46 (arguing 
that the presumption’s preference for married fathers serves legitimate policy purposes even in 
the face of biological reality). 
 236. Even as an institution, understanding what constitutes a marriage can vary from person 
to person and can offer a different face depending upon context. “Marriage can be experienced as: 
a legal tie, a symbol of commitment, a privileged sexual affiliation, a relationship of hierarchy 
and subordination, a means of self-fulfillment, a societal construct, a cultural phenomenon, a 
religious mandate, an economic relationship, a preferred reproductive unit, a way to ensure 
against poverty and dependency, a romantic ideal, a natural or divined connection, a stand-in for 
morality, a status, or a contractual relationship.” Fineman, supra note 6, at 242. 
 237. Traditional marriage is statistically in the minority of family units. Id. at 246. Fineman 
notes that the latest census figures show that traditional arrangements account for less than a 
quarter of households. Id. at 246 n.16. The numbers are actually higher in single person 
households, cohabitating adults, and childless couples. Id. (citing Eric Schmitt, For the First 
Time, Nuclear Families Drop Below 25% of Households, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2001, at A1 
(reporting on the 2000 U.S. Census data)). See also Alison Young, Reconceiving the Family: 
Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 515–18 (1998) 
(discussing a broader concept of family beyond the traditional nuclear family). 
 238. SCOTT B. RAE, THE ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: BRAVE NEW 
FAMILIES? 77 (1994). The Center for Disease Control estimates that there were 61,610 live born 
infants in 2011 as a result of the use of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART). CTR. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY FERTILITY CLINIC 
SUCCESS RATES REPORT (2011), available at www.cdc.gov/art/ART2011?index.htm. “ART 
includes all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are handled.” What is Assisted 
Reproductive Technology?, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2011), 
http://www.cdc.gov/art/whatis.html. This does not include intrauterine or artificial insemination 
or “procedures in which a woman takes medicine only to stimulate egg production without the 
intention of having eggs retrieved.” Id. This inadequacy is more palpable in the field of 
gestational surrogacy than arguably anywhere else. Gestational surrogacy involves three distinct 
parties—the mother who donates the egg, the father who donates the sperm and the carrier who 
provides the womb. Or—conversely donated sperm and egg of others, or one or the other with the 
result that the child is not genetically related to any of the intimately involved parties. The 
number of births from gestational surrogacy has grown exponentially in the last decade. One 
report indicates that there was an eighty-nine percent increase in the number of babies born to 
gestational surrogates from 2004 to 2008. Magdalena Gugucheva, Surrogacy in America, 
COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS (2010), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org 
/pagedocuments/kaevej0a1m.pdf. 
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Courts have had to address non-gestational biological mothers 
seeking to assert their maternal rights
239
 and gestational non-
biological surrogates trying to avoid legal parent responsibilities.
240
 
While paternity and custody statutes have been used as frameworks 
to resolve these problems, courts have struggled with newer 
conceptions of who is a “parent.”
241
 Thus, even the “simplest” 
determination of who is the father or mother of a child has become a 
much more challenging question not easily resolved by traditional 
legal presumptions alone. 
With respect to a father outside of an intact marriage, there is 
also a stigma that remains. The formalism with which a marriage is 
treated in this circumstance fails to reflect reality as well.
242
 Clearly, 
protecting something that is already broken makes less sense than 
protecting an attack from a party completely outside an  
otherwise-intact marriage, such as in the case where a person outside 
the marriage believes he would be a better parent. The fault in this is 
more obvious when carried through to a different conclusion. 
Consider for a moment what happens when a marriage is broken and 
parties divorce; if marriage confers rights on a father, then why give 
a legal father any rights to his child at all when the marriage ends? If 
the marriage holds the parental rights, then why does not remarriage 
bestow parental rights, versus in loco parentis rights, on a stepfather? 
 
 239. See Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1357 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
 240. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2002). 
 241. As the court in Roberto d.B. noted, “[w]hat ha[s] not been fathomed exists today.” Id. at 
122. Even sperm donation can create unforeseen problems if performed improperly. Recently, a 
man who served as a sperm donor was found to be the legal father of the child born of that 
donation, even though the parties had no intention of him being the father and he had signed away 
his parental rights. Heather Saul, U.S. Court Rules Sperm Donor to Lesbian Couple Is Legal 
Father and Must Pay Child Support, INTERNATIONAL, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world 
/americas/us-court-rules-sperm-donor-william-marotta-is-legal-father-and-must-pay-child-
support-9079296.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2014). Under Kansas law, a sperm donor is deemed a 
legal father if the insemination procedure is not performed by a licensed physician. Id. In that 
case, because the state did not recognize same-sex marriage or adoption, and because the 
biological mother was on public assistance, the state sought reimbursement from the sperm 
donor. Id. 
 242. As more than one author has noted, where a child is born of an intact marriage to a 
biological father outside of that marriage, chances are the marital unit is not as stable as one 
might presume. See, e.g., In re Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); J.W.T., 872 
S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994).  
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C.  Viewing Relationships in a New Way– 
Changing the Message,  
Resolving the Equal Protection Issue 
When the Supreme Court denied Michael H. his fundamental 
right to parent, it did so by failing to focus on the nature of his right 
and equal protection.
243
 Instead of conferring a fundamental right to 
parent on an individual, it conferred it on a “marriage” or a “marital 
unit.”
244
 The problem is that the Constitution was not designed to 
protect marriages; it was designed to protect an individual’s right to 
marry.
245
 The Constitution has been interpreted to protect an 
individual’s right to procreate, not a marriage’s right to procreate.
246
 
The Constitution did not define individual rights so that they might 
only be exercised in the legally defined context of marriage. By 
virtue of preferring a marital connection to a child over a biological 
connection to a child, the Supreme Court has imbued an institution 
with an individual right. Not only has the right been tied to a legal 
status but also the underlying reason for such a presumption no 
longer exists, so the state lacks a rational basis to exclude biological 
fathers on that basis.
247
 Instead, the presumption perpetuates gender-
based distinctions that harm fathers. The only way to shake this 
paradigm is to challenge the notions that are the basis for these 
decisions and demonstrate why a broader vision of gender and 
parenthood is important. 
While there is value in allowing the presumption to remain as an 
administrative convenience for both parents and the state, there is 
 
 243. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110. 
 244. Id. at 129. 
 245. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized 
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”); 
Zablocki v. Redhaul, 434 U.S. 378 (1978) (invalidating condition of marriage license on proof 
that child support payments have been made and that child will not become a public charge). 
 246. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating forced sterilization of a habitual 
offender). 
 247. “[T]here is a world of difference between noting that men and women often fill different 
roles in society and using these different roles as the justification for imposing inflexible legal 
restrictions on one sex and not the other. To do the latter is to govern on the basis of stereotyping 
assumptions, an approach that has been repeatedly criticized by the Supreme Court.” Miller v. 
Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., dissenting) (challenging 
constitutionality of statute governing citizenship of illegitimate child born abroad to American 
father and alien mother) (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369 (1979); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 
(1996) (holding military college excluding women applicants violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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arguably no value in allowing it to be imbued with the right to 
prevent a biological parent from asserting his fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. The presumption, indeed the absolute 
preference, favoring “formal families” based upon one mother, one 
father, and child to the exclusion of all other formations of a 
caregiving unit has outlived its usefulness.
248
 
V.  HOW COULD IT WORK? 
The power given the presumption needs to be restrained so that 
it functions as an administrative default and not a legally defining 
default. In order to truly protect a biological father’s rights, however, 
particularly where there are conflicting claims of paternity, 
abandoning the notion that more than two people can be legally 
recognized as a child’s parent is paramount.
249
 Thus, in this instance, 
where there are competing interests—for example, a biological father 
and a married biological mother, the biological father would be able 
to challenge the presumption at any time. To some extent, it would 
still fulfill the Court’s desire that an unmarried biological father take 
some affirmative action to assert his rights, but it would not be based 
on when he chose to assert his rights. As a practical matter, the legal 
father is often heard on the issue of paternity upon the failure of the 
marriage, so why not extend the same right to the biological father 
during the marriage. 
A court must still consider the best interests of the child and the 
behavior of all the parties involved when making custody, visitation, 
and support decisions.
250
 This would allow courts to consider 
 
 248. Fineman argues that for all “relevant and . . . societal purposes” we do not need marriage 
at all. Fineman, supra note 6, at 245. While Fineman correctly notes that it may be a preferable 
mode of protecting certain rights, in the context of parenting children, a marriage is not required 
anymore than, arguably, a limit of only two recognized parents in that marriage. What is 
necessary is a caretaking unit or units that undertake the care, support, and education of children, 
no matter what form it takes. 
 249. See Laura Althouse, Three’s Company? How American Law Can Recognize a Third 
Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 172 (2008) 
(discussing in part a Canadian appellate court decision recognizing that the biological mother’s 
same sex partner was the child’s legal mother, in addition to the biological mother and father who 
retained their parental rights and advocated for a three parent structure for same-sex families); 
Parentage at Birth, supra note 226, at 913 (constructing a definition of parentage that would 
permit more than one father). 
 250. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(3)(d) (West 2013) (“In cases where a child has 
more than two parents, the court shall allocate custody and visitation among the parents based on 
the best interest of the child, including, but not limited to, addressing the child’s need for 
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collateral matters, such as fraud on the part of the mother and 
relationships that have been in place, and not to presume if all a 
biological father wants is visitation that his failure to seek full 
custody is an indication that he does not really want to parent. If it is 
not an all-or-nothing proposition, then all parties are on notice that 
their choices and conduct are relevant.
251
 
As a practical matter, adopting either dual paternity like 
Louisiana, or using a statute like the one recently passed in 
California would be a place to start.
252
 Considering different 
relationships and the impact of ART will also be critical. However, it 
is not that the presumption itself needs to be abolished,
253
 but it 
should be properly relegated to the status of administrative 
convenience for states and married couples alike, not the ultimate 
determiner of rights when there is a conflict. 
Given the fluid nature of families and domestic relationships, the 
timing of a biological father’s assertion of rights should not be a 
determinative factor because the biological father may be hesitant to 
 
continuity and stability by preserving established patterns of care and emotional bonds. The court 
may order that not all parents share legal or physical custody of the child if the court finds that it 
would not be in the best interest of the child as provided in Sections 3011 and 3020.”). 
 251. This may alleviate another concern that in recognizing rights for one group of 
individuals, unmarried putative fathers, the courts and states necessarily impact the rights of 
another group “marital family units.” See Hirczy, supra note 45, at 1641. Hirczy discusses the 
concerns raised by Justice Cornyn’s dissent that the court was doing nothing more than creating 
rights for putative fathers at the expense of marital family units that were entitled to protection 
from state action. Id. I would suggest that it is not so much creating rights at the expense of other 
rights, but balancing rights between private parties that may have concurrent cognizable 
constitutional rights to parent. 
 252. See State ex rel. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Howard, 898 So. 2d 443, 444 (La. 2004) 
(recognizing the concept of “dual paternity” for support purposes); see also Warren v. Richard, 
296 So. 2d 813, 817 (La. 1974) (“[I]t is the biological relationship and dependency which is 
determinative of the child’s rights . . . and not the classification into which the child is placed by 
the statutory law of the State.”); Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854 (La. 1989) (“The biological 
father does not escape his support obligations merely because others may share with him the 
responsibility”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:236.1.2 (2012) (“The department is hereby authorized 
to develop and implement a program of access and visitation designed to support and facilitate 
noncustodial parent’s access to and visitation of their children.”). 
 253. Dowd’s proposal to abolish or redefine the presumption to recognize social fatherhood is 
an excellent one, particularly in the sense that marriage would merely demonstrate a positive 
relationship with the other parent. Parentage at Birth, supra note 226, at 929. However, I would 
be concerned it would not necessarily extend far enough to protect biological fathers outside of 
those marital relationships when there are competing parental interests because the social 
fatherhood she imagines may not exist through no fault of a biological father outside of a married 
family. That is where recognition of more than two legal fathers would become critical to protect 
the right of the biological father to develop such a relationship. Id. at 934–35 (proposing revisions 
to the Uniform Parentage Act to accommodate multiple fatherhood with maternal consent). 
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assert legal rights at first or perhaps the access he has been given to 
his child is enough. The presumption that the biological father’s 
failure to take affirmative legal action within the first two years 
evinces a desire to not be a part of a child’s life, or that such a desire 
should not be recognized is offensive to fathers, particularly those 
outside of a marital relationship.
254
 An unmarried biological father 
whose child is born of a marriage is always an outsider looking in. 
To the extent further burdening the courts might be a concern, 
the reality is the courts are well equipped to resolve custody issues 
and are well acquainted with the best-interests-of-the-child test. 
Additionally, as with all things, courts will only be required to 
address these issues when the parties cannot agree on their own 
visitation and custody arrangements. In fact, it may actually 
encourage parties to resolve their differences instead of resorting to 
the courts where it is clear that a biological father, whether married 
or unmarried, will never lose his parental rights unless he voluntarily 
relinquishes them or the state demonstrates he is unfit.
255
 The very 
real problem of domestic violence and abuse would need to be 
considered.
256
 Fashioning safeguards to protect against those who 
would seek to use their parental rights to control a situation in an 
unhealthy way is always a concern, regardless of whom that parent 
is. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
June Carbone observes that what has become one of the most 
contentious issues in family law is which adults should receive legal 
 
 254. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 255. The dynamic between married mother and unwed biological father will always be 
problematic, because frankly any relationship that involves this group of parties is likely to be 
“unhappy.” Of course, such problems have been handled by families and the courts regularly as 
parties divorce, remarry, seek stepparent adoptions and otherwise shift in and out of the primary 
caregiving roles in a child’s life and in and out of each other’s lives. It should not prevent the 
protection of a father’s inchoate relationship with his child. 
 256. See generally Dana Harrington Conner, Back to the Drawing Board: Barriers to Joint 
Decision-Making in Custody Cases Involving Intimate Partner Violence, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. 
& POL’Y 223 (2011) (discussing custody in cases involving “intimate partner violence”); Joan S. 
Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial 
Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 657 (2003) 
(discussing domestic violence and child welfare); see also Judith Koons, Gunsmoke and Legal 
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recognition in children’s lives.
257
 She contends that a combination of 
readily available means to definitively determine paternity as well as 
an instability in the primary mode of determining paternity account 
for the shift.
258
 Thus, Carbone suggests that “if parental obligation to 
children is independent of the adult relationship, then definition of 
that obligation must start with the recognition of parenthood.”
259
 
As our caregiving units change and evolve, expectations must 
shift. The courts and the states should expect that all fathers want to 
be part of their children’s lives, and should affirmatively protect that 
expectation just as they do with mothers. Allowing meaningful 
participation in a child’s life to every parent initially, providing an 
avenue for that inchoate relationship to develop, sends a different 
message and begins to recognize the emotional connection men can 
have to their children regardless of whether they are married to the 
biological mother. Additionally, including all fathers in the 
caregiving unit presumptively can resolve the lingering equal 
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